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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 This dissertation is entitled “Three Essays in Health Econometrics and Health 
Economics.”  This reflects the notion that there are two broad focuses of the research 
contained herein.  In particular, chapters II and III provide econometric contributions that 
are relevant in the estimation of health care expenditure models.  Chapter IV is an applied 
contribution that investigates the effect of Medicare Part D, Medicare’s prescription drug 
program, on the use of hospital services. 
 The second chapter provides an extensive review of the literature that has debated 
the relative merits of the two-part model, popularized by the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment researchers, and Heckman’s classic sample selection model.  Upon 
completion of this extensive review a general econometric model is described, which we 
demonstrate nests both a conventional two-part model and a conventional sample-
selection model.  This serves to clarify some of the more nuanced points of controversy 
in the reviewed literature. 
 The third chapter further explores the two-part model, but addresses the issue of 
endogeneity on the right-hand side of the model.  In this chapter it is demonstrated that 
extant approaches to endogeneity have failed to consider the implications of endogeneity 
on the “separability” of the two parts of the two-part model.  This chapter also presents a 
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novel estimator that can estimate two-part model parameters without imposing 
“separability” and in the presence of an endogenous dummy regressor. 
 The fourth chapter analyzes the role that Medicare Part D plays in the health of 
Medicare beneficiaries and the effect that this relatively new program has had on the use 
of hospital services.  In particular, this chapter presents a mediation analysis that explores 
whether improvements in beneficiary health can explain the negative relationship that has 
previously been documented in the literature between Medicare Part D and the use of, or 
expenditures on, hospital care. 
 The fifth chapter concludes. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
TWO-PART MODELS VERSUS SAMPLE-SELECTION MODELS 
 
 
The two-part model (Cragg, 1971) remains a popular method for estimating 
patient-level healthcare expenditures (Bell, Zimmerman, Arterburn, & Maciejewski, 
2011; Finkelstein, Trogdon, Cohen, & Dietz, 2009; Trogdon, Finkelstein, Feagan, & 
Cohen, 2012).  The popularity of the two-part model is likely due to its use in the Rand 
Health Insurance Study (Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, & Leibowitz, 1987).  
Applied researchers frequently test whether the two-part model is appropriate by 
applying Heckman’s (1976; 1978) sample-selection model to determine if there exists 
correlation between the two parts of the model (Andreyeva, Sturm, & Ringel, 2004; 
Sullivan, Ghushchyan, Wyatt, & Hill, 2007).  This practice is illegitimate and results 
from a misunderstanding of the “cake debate” literature, which debated the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches.  The objective of this chapter is to 
provide some technical resolutions to the “cake debates.”  This objective is accomplished 
by developing an encompassing theoretical framework that hierarchically organizes a 
comprehensive set of health care expenditure models, including double-hurdle models 
and minimally parametric versions of both the two-part and sample-selection models.
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Two recent treatments of the two-part and sample-selection models have proposed 
a unifying classification system that in principle accomplishes these objectives.  Madden 
(2008) presents a classification system based on the bivariate normal double-hurdle 
model (see also Jones, 1989; Jones & Yen 2000).  Wooldridge (2010) considers normal 
versions of both models.  Both of these analyses rely on restrictive primitive assumptions 
that are stronger than necessary for consistent estimation.  Furthermore, both analyses 
overlook some of the more nuanced points raised in the literature.  Therefore they fail to 
provide a comprehensive understanding of these two methodological approaches.  A 
more complete analysis can be accomplished with weaker assumptions imposed from the 
outset.  In particular, a more complete analysis should formally synthesize the extant 
knowledge in a way that does not implicitly ignore more generic cases. 
 
A Recent Debate 
 A recent exchange (Salas & Raferty, 2001; Seshamini & Gray, 2004; Zweifel, 
Felder, & Meiers, 1999; 2001) provides an application-oriented presentation of what is 
currently known about two-part and sample-selection models.  This exchange illustrates 
the significant confusion that still exists in applied health economics regarding these two 
models.  Before reviewing the early “cake debate” literature I consider this more recent 
exchange. 
 Health economists have for some time expressed concern over the explosion of 
healthcare costs experienced in many developed countries.  It has been proposed that a 
large proportion of the increase in healthcare expenditures may be due to the changing 
demographic composition of developed economies.  In particular, it is noted that OECD 
 5 
countries have experienced a radical increase in the proportion, and number, of 
individuals aged 65 and older.  Since there exists a strong association between age and 
likelihood of severe and chronic illnesses, it is plausible that a more elderly population 
will spend more on healthcare.  Zweifel et al. (1999) offer an alternative explanation. 
Specifically, they test the hypothesis that proximity to death is a more important causal 
factor in the increase in health expenditures.  Under this hypothesis, a more elderly 
population will have no effect on healthcare expenditures unless that elderly population 
also has a higher proportion of individuals close to death. 
 Zweifel et al. (1999) test their hypothesis using panel data from two Swiss 
sickness funds, one representative of a more rural population and the other representative 
of a more urban population.  They use Heckman’s sample-selection model to estimate 
age and quarter-to-death effects on hospital expenditures.  Zweifel et al. (1999) argue that 
a sample-selection correction is necessary because the strictly positive expenditure 
subsample represents a “sick” sample.  Their test of the proximity-to-death hypothesis 
amounts to testing the significance of the coefficients on age and the coefficients on 
quarter-to-death in the second-stage equation.  They find that quarter-to-death has a 
significant and increasing effect on health expenditures, but that age has an insignificant 
effect.  This finding confirms their hypothesis. 
Salas and Raftery (2001) critique Zweifel et al.’s (1999) implementation of the 
sample-selection model.  In particular, they note the lack of exclusion restrictions in their 
specification.  They argue that without exclusion restrictions the inverse Mills ratio is 
approximately a linear function of the same covariates used in the linear index portion of 
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the second-stage equation.  Assuming that Zweifel et al. (1999) included only age and 
age squared in their first-stage probit equation, the inverse Mills ratio and age will be 
highly collinear in the second-stage equation.1  Therefore, the lack of significance of the 
age coefficient might be explained by a standard error problem resulting from multi-
collinearity.  Zweifel et al. (2001) note that they included much more than age and age 
squared in their first-stage probit specification, and thus a smaller degree of multi-
collinearity is implied. 
Seshamani and Gray (2004) replicate the study conducted by Zweifel et al. 
(1999), and explore further the issue of multi-collinearity raised by Salas and Raftery 
(2001).  They use data from the Oxford Record Linkage study (ORLS), a data set similar 
to the Swiss data used by Zweifel et al.  In a comparable specification to Zweifel et al.’s 
(1999) specification, they find significant evidence of multi-collinearity between the 
inverse Mills ratio and the age variable.  Furthermore, they find quantitatively and 
qualitatively similar results regarding the effect of age and proximity to death.  However, 
in a two-part specification they find a significant age effect.  They conclude that the 
distinction between the two-part and sample-selection models is practically important, 
because the two methods can radically differ. 
In addition to revisiting the multi-collinearity issue, Seshamani and Gray (2004) 
also argue that the sample-selection model is inappropriate on conceptual grounds.  In 
particular, they claim that “a sample selection model is really only necessary when the 
selection is unobserved… This is not the case with the [Zweifel et al., 1999] and ORLS 
                                                
1 Zweifel et al. (1999) do not present results from their first-stage probit, but discuss the results on 
age and age squared in the first-stage. 
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data sets, where all zero cost observations were observed” (p. 306).2  In the case of 
“observed selection,” the sample-selection model estimates parameters consistent with 
the concept of potential health expenditures; that is, the expenditures that non-
hospitalized individuals would have had if they had been hospitalized.  Seshamani and 
Gray (2004) propose that potential expenditures do not inform actual budgetary 
considerations. 
 
The “Cake Debates” 
The review of the “Cake Debates” provided here is organized around the 
following four points: 
 
1. Two-part models estimate actual outcomes, while sample-selection models 
estimate potential outcomes; 
2. The two-part model is more flexible than Tobit and sample-selection models; 
3. The two-part model is not technically nested in the sample-selection model; and 
4. Even when the sample-selection model is the conceptually “correct” approach the 
two-part model may have better statistical properties. 
 
 
The first point motivates the need for a comprehensive understanding of two-part and 
sample selection models.  Specifically, these methodologies are categorically distinct, 
and the distinctions have implications with regard to the interpretation of the obtained 
results.  The second and third points indicate a significant gap in our knowledge since 
consensus remains illusive regarding these points in the literature.  Finally, the fourth 
point implies that there are important statistical considerations that applied researchers 
should be aware of regardless of conceptual considerations. 
                                                
2 The statement “selection is unobserved” doesn’t really make sense here.  It is likely that the 
authors’ mean that selection is based on unobservables. 
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The distinction between an actual versus a potential outcome is a common 
distinction made in the literature regarding the two-part and sample-selection models.  It 
provides a good way of categorizing the theoretical distinctions between the two 
competing methods.  It also represents an important distinction that must be understood 
by the applied researcher if the researcher wants to impart the correct interpretation on 
the obtained results. 
Duan, Manning, Morris, and Newhouse (1983) compared several possible 
estimators for estimating health care expenditure equations.  They rejected the sample-
selection model from this comparison on the basis of theoretical considerations alone.  In 
particular, they observed that the sample-selection model estimates an “unconditional” 
expenditure equation.  They argued that this is an inappropriate estimation objective 
because they were interested in modeling “conditional” expenditures.  In other words, 
zero expenditure is an actual observation, not a conveniently coded missing value for 
some unknown potential observation. 
Hay and Olsen (1984) argued that potential outcomes are interesting in the 
context of health expenditures.  In particular, they proposed that one can consider the 
dichotomous decision to seek medical care or not as a “latent propensity to access the 
health care system” (p. 281).  Under this interpretation, one may be interested in the 
potential expenditures of individuals who failed to have a large enough “propensity to 
access the health care system.”  Furthermore, they argued that if one is interested in 
potential outcomes one should not ignore information obtained from the first-part 
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dichotomous participation decision equation in the analysis of “unconditional” 
expenditures.   
Maddala (1985a) noted that one might conceptualize all individuals as needing 
some sort of medical intervention.  Individuals only decide, however, to seek medical 
care when their perception of need for medical intervention becomes sufficiently high.  
Even when the perception of need is low, there may be known or unknown health issues 
that would benefit from medical treatment.  Unmet medical need translates conceptually 
into what Duan et al. (1983) and Duan, Manning, Morris, and Newhouse (1984) call 
“potential” expenditures. 
Dow and Norton (2003) attempted to clarify the distinction between actual and 
potential outcomes by classifying an actual outcome as a “corner solution outcome” 
(Wooldridge, 2010 also uses this language).  They also put forth the argument that 
potential outcomes are uninformative in terms of actual private and/or public budgetary 
considerations. 3  Finally, they claimed that if the outcome is fully observed (i.e., the 
outcome is an actual outcome), then there is no need to correct for selection bias.  This 
latter point is of particular relevance to the choice between a two-part and sample-
selection model. 
It is worth bearing in mind that the two-part model was initially researched as a 
flexible extension to the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958).  It is well known that two restrictive 
features hamper the Tobit model (Wooldridge, 2010; Greene, 2012).  First, the effects of 
                                                
3 It is important to make the distinction here between a potential expenditure that would occur 
generally if non-spenders became spenders, and a potential expenditure that might occur given a change in 
an exogenous regressor.  These are distinct concepts, and treatment of the two concepts should be treated 
distinctly. 
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a regressor on the probability that the outcome is positive and on the conditional mean of 
the outcome must have the same sign since a single coefficient vector is estimated.  This 
may be particularly restrictive in a variety of contexts.  For instance, Wooldridge (2010) 
considered an example of estimating the extensiveness of life insurance coverage.  It is 
reasonable to assume that individuals have an increasing probability of obtaining life 
insurance policies as they age, but that the extent of coverage will decline with age.  This 
assumption cannot be incorporated in the Tobit estimation framework.  Second, the 
proportional effect of two continuous regressors on both the probability that the outcome 
is positive and on the conditional mean of the outcome must necessarily be equal.  Again, 
this is because there is only one estimated coefficient vector.  Since the two-part model 
estimates two sets of parameters it is a more flexible approach than the Tobit model. 
Furthermore, Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) argued that separating the decision to 
seek medical treatment from the decision regarding how much medical treatment to 
consume is natural.  From a theoretical perspective they propose that the decision to seek 
medical treatment is most naturally governed by the theory developed by Grossman 
(1972), wherein individuals choose to consume medical services to increase their “health 
stock.”  They argue that Grossman’s theory is applicable here because individuals choose 
whether or not to see a physician on their own, and Grossman’s model is an individual-
level decision-making model.  On the other hand, the decision regarding how much 
medical treatment to consume is most naturally governed by principal-agent theory, 
wherein individuals do not make decisions per se but contract physicians to act as agents 
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on their behalf.  Accordingly, Pohlmeier and Ulrich suggest that a two-part model is more 
theoretically congruent than a one-part model such as the Tobit model. 
Duan et al. (1983; 1984) argued that the two-part model represents a more flexible 
specification than Heckman’s sample-selection model.  They pointed out that the sample-
selection model relies on restrictive assumptions regarding the joint distribution of the 
error terms in the first and second equations.  They reasoned that almost any parametric 
assumption could be used in the two-part model specification, whereas the sample-
selection model relies on the bivariate normality assumption.  This is a notion that is 
echoed in Angrist (2001).  The implication of Angrist’s argument suggests that the 
flexibility of the two-part model is more apparent than real, however. 
Hay and Olsen (1984) argued that the two-part model is not the general model, 
but is a special case of the more general sample-selection model.  Namely, they argue 
that the two-part model is essentially the same model, but it is assumed from the outset 
that there is independence between the first and second equation.  On the face, it appears 
straightforward that if one begins with the sample-selection model’s second-stage 
equation, then the two-part model obtains when zero correlation is imposed.  Hay and 
Olsen (1984) made this argument with a bit more sophistication.  In particular, they 
added “structure” to the two-part model by assuming the existence of a potential 
outcome, which is observed only when the hurdle component of the two-part model is 
exceeded.  Of course, the two-part model makes no such assumption since the two-part 
model describes an actual outcome.  Nonetheless, Hay and Olsen attempted to 
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demonstrate that with a latent level assumed at zero it must be the case that independence 
is assumed.  They were unable to definitively demonstrate this, however. 
Duan et al. (1984) made two arguments to the contrary.  First, they noted that 
Duan et al. (1983) presents a “normal-theory” version of the two-part model.  The 
normal-theory version of the two-part model assumes that the error terms in both the 
first- and second-parts of the model are normally distributed.  Nothing is specified with 
regard to whether the error terms are jointly distributed, and if so, whether they are 
correlated.  Importantly, they propose that the two-part model is consistent with a wide 
variety of alternative parametric assumptions regarding the second- as well as first-part 
error terms.  In this sense, any two-part model that does not assume second-part 
normality is not strictly nested in Heckman’s sample-selection model. 
Duan et al. (1984) also debunked the independence argument that Hay and Olsen 
made.  They accomplish this by constructing an example wherein two jointly distributed 
error terms with nonzero correlation can be transformed to obtain error term distributions 
that are consistent with the two-part model.  The correlation between the two error terms 
plays no role in the likelihood function for that example, and therefore they claim that the 
two-part model avoids estimation of a “nuisance parameter.”  Maddala (1985a) noted that 
this example is “purely semantic,” because the two-part model cannot identify the 
correlation between the two error terms anyway.  He further commented that it might be 
an ill-advisable practice to construct models wherein the correlation cannot ever be 
estimated.   
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Maddala also made an informal argument that the two models are non-nested.  He 
distinguished between the two methods by the way in which each method defines error 
terms.  Specifically, he notes that the sample-selection model makes use of an error term 
in the second-stage that is defined over the entire population, while the two-part model 
makes use of an error term in the second-part that is defined only over the subpopulation 
of participants.  This distinction has practical importance in the sense that the former 
error term is useful for modeling a “joint” decision process (i.e., a process wherein the 
two levels of decision-making are dependent on each other), while the latter error term is 
useful for modeling a “sequential” decision process (i.e., a process wherein the two levels 
of decision-making are independent of each other).  Maddala concluded that the issue of 
nesting is a second-order concern since the two models are clearly different at a 
fundamental level; the first-order concern should be whether the concept of sequential 
decision-making is more appropriate than joint decision making. 
A more recent literature (Jones, 1989; Jones & Yen, 2000; Madden, 2008) has 
attempted to provide clarification with regard to the classification, and nesting status, of 
the two-part and sample-selection models by nesting both models in the bivariate normal 
double-hurdle model with dependence.  The double hurdle model specifies two latent 
variable processes: 1) the first-hurdle equation, and 2) the extent of participation 
equation.  The error terms are assumed to be bivariate normally distributed in all of the 
works cited above.  Any transformation of the observed dependent variable can be 
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applied.4  The first-hurdle equation generates either zero or one values.  The extent of 
participation equation generates zero outcomes whenever a Tobit-type corner solution 
occurs, or a continuous and positive outcome otherwise.  The observed outcome is the 
product of the first-hurdle outcome, and the Tobit outcome that derives from the extent of 
participation equation. 
Importantly, this literature demonstrates that first-hurdle dominance implies a 
single-hurdle model.  First-hurdle dominance assumes that the dichotomous decision of 
zero versus nonzero is the only threshold that must be overcome in order for the observed 
continuous outcome to be equal to the latent outcome defined in the second-hurdle 
equation.  In economic terms, Madden (2008) describes first-hurdle dominance as 
assuming that “zero consumption does not arise from a standard corner solution but 
instead represents a separate discrete choice” (p. 301).  In the case of first-hurdle 
dominance, the second hurdle does not matter, but dependence is still a possibility.  Since 
they assume dependence and bivariate normality, the single-hurdle model that obtains is 
the sample-selection model.  The likelihood function for the normal-theory version of the 
two-part model is obtained if the correlation parameter in the sample-selection model is 
set equal to zero. 
Another strand of the literature (Dow & Norton, 2003; Hay, Leu, & Rohrer, 1987; 
Leung & Yu, 1996; Manning, Duan, & Rogers, 1987; Norton, Dow, & Do, 2008; Puhan, 
2000) has conducted a series of Monte Carlo studies regarding the relative performances 
of the two-part and sample-selection models under one of the following three data 
                                                
4 Jones and Yen (2000) consider the Box-Cox transformation since it relaxes the normality 
assumption. 
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generating assumptions: 1) the two-part model is correct, 2) the sample-selection model 
is correct, and 3) neither model is correct.  The general consensus in this literature seems 
to be that even when the sample-selection model is the “correct” model, the two-part 
model is likely to outperform the sample-selection model in terms of parameter 
estimation and predictive power.  The reason the literature has provided for this strange 
conclusion is that the two-part model excels in its small sample properties, whereas the 
sample-selection model suffers from rather important issues regarding “practical 
identification.”  In particular, the two-part model is biased whenever the sample-selection 
model correctly describes the data generating process, but the sample-selection model’s 
use of the inverse Mills ratio correction frequently induces a severe multi-collinearity 
problem that causes incredible imprecision.  Of course, valid exclusion restrictions can in 
principle solve the multi-collinearity problem.  In the absence of exclusion restrictions, 
though, one can test between the methods by assuming that the sample-selection model is 
consistent (i.e., “correct”), and computing what Dow and Norton (2003) call an 
“empirical” mean-squared error.  The mean squared error is unknowable in practice since 
one does not have access to the amount of bias induced by applying the two-part model. 
The “empirical” version of the mean squared error criterion uses the statistical distance 
between the estimates to approximate the bias assuming that the sample-selection 
estimates are true. 
 
A General Model With Dependence 
In this section I develop a fully general modeling framework with which I can 
organize the two-part and sample-selection models.  With that in mind I use as few 
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distributional assumptions from the outset to avoid defining a hierarchical classification 
that is the result of the distributional class of models under consideration.  Dependence 
between the first- and second-equations is a more general concept than correlation in a 
bivariate normal framework.  Accordingly, from the outset I let the dependence between 
the two equations follow a much less restricted definition.  I specify the first-equation as 
a linear-index probit/logit process, as this is typical in all the models discussed above and 
is not the point of contention between any of the models. 
Let *H  denote the (first-)hurdle latent outcome, which is generated as follows: 
 
*
p p1 o1 o1 uH X X β Xβ= + + ,  (1) 
 
 
where pX  denotes a policy variable, informally defined as the variable of interest, o1X  
denotes the (first-)hurdle vector of observable confounders, uX  denotes an unobserved 
stochastic determinant and will elsewhere be referred to as an unobserved confounder to 
be distinguished from the observed confounders, and 1 p1 o1β β β⎡ ⎤′ ′⎣= ⎦ denotes the 
parameter vector.  The conditional random variable u p o1,(X X| X )  must have a known, 
or specified, distribution.  This is typically normal or logistic.  In double-hurdle 
modeling, the first-hurdle defines whether or not the individual is a participant (e.g., in 
health expenditure applications, the first-hurdle determines whether the individual is in 
the market for healthcare at all).  Let H  denote the observed dichotomous participation 
decision.  Equation (1) relates to the observed dichotomous participation decision as 
follows: 
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*
*
1 if H 0
H
0 if 0.H
⎧
≤
>
= ⎪⎨
⎪⎩
  (2) 
 
 
Now let *Y  denote a latent extent of participation outcome.  It is generically 
generated as follows: 
 
( )* p o2 u p o u 2Y q X X , X ; , ,, γ γ γ κ= × , (3) 
 
 
where q(  ) denotes an arbitrary functional form, o2X  is a subset, though not necessarily 
strict, of o1X , p o uγ γ γ γ′ = ⎡ ⎤′⎣ ⎦  denotes the parameter vector, and 2κ  denotes an error 
term.  It must be minimally maintained that  
 
2 p o1 uE | X , X ,κ 1X , H⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ .  (4) 
 
 
Equation (4) is a minimal parametric assumption and could be replaced with a full 
distributional assumption regarding the conditional random variable 
2 p o1 u( | X , X , Xκ , H) .  Inclusion of the (first-)hurdle error term in (3) imposes 
dependence between the (first-)hurdle and the extent of participation outcomes.  A 
second-hurdle is said to exist if the latent outcome, *Y , can be overridden by a corner 
solution outcome.  Define a new latent variable that represents the utility-maximizing 
choice regarding extent of participation, and denote this variable by *C .  If one cannot 
assume first-hurdle dominance (Jones, 1989; Madden, 2008), then the latent extent of 
participation is given by: 
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( )* *C max 0, Y= ,  (5) 
 
 
and the observed outcome, Y, is given by: 
 
*Y CH= × .  (6) 
 
 
The structure embodied in (5) suggests the use of a Tobit-type specification for the 
conditional on participation portion of the estimation problem.  Equation (6) implies that 
there are two sources of the zero outcomes: non-participants have zero outcomes, and 
participants who choose a corner solution have zero outcomes.  Equation (6) also implies 
that there is a potential outcome, since *C  could be positive when H 0=  resulting in a 
zero outcome for Y. 
 If first-hurdle dominance is assumed, then the double-hurdle model reduces to a 
single-hurdle model, and the set of models available reduces to either a two-part or 
sample-selection model.  In this case one does not need to define a latent extent of 
participation variable, *C , since the zero outcomes are all generated by the first-hurdle.  
The concept of a potential outcome is now solely captured by *Y .  If one wishes to 
model potential outcomes, then the observed outcome would be given by: 
 
*Y YH= × ,  (7) 
 
 
and it would become necessary to derive a sample-selection model to estimate parameters 
that relate pX  to the potential outcome 
*Y .  If instead one is interested in modeling an 
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actual outcome, then one replaces equation (3) with a conditional-on-positive data 
generating process where the outcome, denoted by Y l , is a fully observed outcome (i.e., 
there are no latent levels generated).  Y l  is generically generated as follows: 
 
( )( )a a a ap o2 u p o1 1 p o u 2Y q X , X , X | X , X , γ γ γH 1 ; , κ,= ×=l . (3a) 
 
 
The parameter vector, a a a ap o uγ γ γ γ= ⎡ ⎤′ ′⎣ ⎦ , clearly has a different interpretation in the 
actual outcome case versus the potential outcome case.  Furthermore, the stochastic 
component in (3a), a2κ , must have a restricted support since the outcome Y
l  must be 
strictly positive.  In this case (7) is no longer adequate for describing the observed 
outcome since (3a) is only defined whenever H 1=  and therefore an interaction between 
H  and Y l  is not mathematically sensible.  The observed outcome must instead be given 
by: 
 
0 if and only if H 0
Y
Y if and only if H 1.
⎧
=
=⎪
=⎪
⎨
⎩
l   (8) 
 
 
We continue with the actual outcome version of the first-hurdle dominated model 
[defined by (1), (3a), and (8)].  One can write the probability density function for the 
conditional random variable u p o1,( X XX | , H)  as follows (Terza, 1998; 2009): 
 
po1 1 u u po1 1β u X X β u
u p o1
po1 1 po1
[ X [
1
X ] ]g (X g (X
f (X | X , X , H) H
1 G
) )
(1 H)
β β )( X ) G( X
− < ∞ ≤−−≤∞ <⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
× + − ×⎜=
−
⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠− −
,  
  (9) 
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where po1 p o1X X X= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ , [I]g ( )  denotes the known (or specified) probability density 
function for u p o1(X , X| X )  evaluated over the interval I, and [I]G ( )  denotes the known 
(or specified) cumulative distribution function for u p o1(X | X , X )  likewise evaluated over 
the interval I.  Using (9) we can integrate out the unobserved confounder in (3a), leaving 
a feasible conditional mean expression suitable for subsample regression-based 
estimation.  In particular, we can derive a function (left unspecified for now), denoted by 
k(  ), as follows: 
 
p o1 2 p o1k(X , X ; ) E Y | X , X , Hβ 1= =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦   
 
             
po1 1
a
p o2 u po1 2 u po1 u po1
X β
, X , (X | X , H 1); )f (X | X , H 1)d(X | X , Hq(X γ 1)
∞
−
∫ = == =   
 
             po1 1
a
po1 u po1 2 u po1 u po1
β
po
X
1 1
q(X , (X | X , H 1); )g(X | X )d(X | X
X
γ
β
)
1 G( )
−
∞
∫ =
=
− −
, (10) 
 
 
where 2β  denotes a possibly (and appropriately) transformed version of the parameter 
vector a1 2β γ⎡ ⎤′ ′⎣ ⎦ .  Once the calculation in (10) has been conducted, the actual outcomes 
model with first-hurdle dominance can be written in terms of k(  ).  In particular, one 
retains (1) and uses (10) to form the following regression-type equation: 
 
p o1 2 2Y k(X , X ; β )ζ=
l ,  (11) 
 
 
where it must be minimally maintained that 2 p o1ζ 1E | X , X⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ . 
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The two-part model is a reduced-form approach to estimation in the sense that it 
does not specify a primitive behavioral model regarding the relationship between all 
confounders (observable and unobservable alike) and the conditional-on-positive 
outcome (i.e., the two-part model does not specify, or concern itself with, the q(  ) 
function).  Rather, the two-part model directly assumes the functional form of k(  ).  That 
is, the two-part model assumes the solution to the integration problem of (10) is in an 
easy-to-estimate equation that is separable from the first-part equation.  Much of the 
“cake debate” literature has focused on whether or not the two-part model imposes 
independence between its two-parts.  Here it is proposed that given an assumption 
regarding the functional form of k(  ), one can recover a corresponding q(  ) function with 
dependence from which one could derive, via the integration problem described in (10), 
the exact expression assumed by the chosen k(  ) function.  I consider two typical 
examples below. 
The original two-part model (developed by Cragg, 1971 and researched 
extensively by Duan et al., 1983 and 1984) assumes, in our notation, that 
 
o1 2 p p2 o1 op 2β ) expk(X , X , X(X )β β+= . (12) 
 
 
Since the original version of the two-part model uses the logarithm of Y l  the second-part 
equation in regression form is written as 
 
( ) p p2 o1 o2 2X β βln Y )(ζX ln+ +=l ,  (13) 
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where it must be minimally maintained that 2 p o1E ln( ,| 0Xζ ) X⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ .  Additionally, the 
original two-part model assumes that u p o1 ~(X | X N(, X ) 0,1) .  Under these assumptions, 
(12) can be obtained if one assumes that 
 
po1 1 p p2 o1 o2 u u
p o1 u 2 2
po1 1 u u
)exp(X X X )
q(X , X , X
Φ(
; )
)exp(0.5 )
X β β β β
γ
Φ(X β β β
+ +
=
+
. (14) 
 
 
We show in Appendix A that the integration problem described in (10) using (14) does in 
fact result in the expression given in (12).  Furthermore, it is clear that (14) does not 
impose independence between the hurdle and extent of participation decisions. 
To explore the issue of nesting we consider the comparable log-linear version of 
the sample-selection model.  In our notation, the log-linear version of the sample-
selection model assumes that 
 
( )p o1 u 2 p p2 o2 o2 u uln , γ )q(X X X β β, X ; X βX= + + . (15) 
 
 
In this version of the sample-selection model, the conditional mean of the logarithm of 
Y l  is obtained rather than the conditional mean of Y l .  As with the log-linear version of 
the two-part model, the log-linear version of the sample-selection model assumes that 
u p o1 ~(X | X N(, X ) 0,1) .  Since (15) is additively separable in the observable components 
and the unobserved confounder, the integration problem in (10) can be written as 
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po1 1
u u u
β
p o1 2 p p2 o o2 u
po1 1
X
X φ(X
β ) X β β β
Φ(X β )
)dX
k(X , X ; X
−
∞
∫
= + +   
                                     
                                     po1 1p p2 o2 o2 u
po1 1
φ(X β
β β β
Φ(
X
X )
)
X
β
= + + . (16) 
 
 
Equation (16) is equivalent to Heckman’s approach, though its derivation does not 
require bivariate normality. 
 A branch of the two-part model literature not discussed above concerns itself with 
the problem of retransforming results obtained from a log- or otherwise transformed 
outcome model such as the log-linear models discussed above (Ai & Norton, 2000; Ai & 
Norton, 2008; Abrevaya, 2002; Basu & Manning, 2009; Blough, Madden, & Hornbrook, 
1999; Don, 1984; Duan, 1983; Manning, 1998; Manning, 2006; Manning & Mullahy, 
2001; Mullahy, 2001; Taylor, 1986; Zhou, Gao, & Hui, 1997).  For this reason it has been 
advocated that one use a nonlinear conditional mean model in the second part of the two-
part model rather than a log-linear regression model (Mullahy, 1998).  It is clear from 
(12) that an exponential version of the two-part model obtains from the same primitive 
model used to derive (12).  One simply doesn’t transform the outcome as it is generated 
by the reduced-form equation k(  ). 
 A comparable exponential conditional mean version of the sample-selection 
model can be derived from an alternative primitive behavioral model.  Furthermore, the 
same qualitative features of the previous example will hold here as well.  In particular, 
assume that u p o1 ~(X | X N(, X ) 0,1)  and that 
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p o1 u 2 p p2 o2 o2 u uγ ) exp(X β βq(X , X , X ; X X )β+ += . (17) 
 
 
Equation (17) is multiplicatively separable in the observable components and the 
unobserved confounder so that the integration problem of (10) can be written as 
 
po1 1X
u u u u
β
p o1 2 p p2 o2 o2
po1 1
exp β )φ(X )dX
β ) exp
(X
k(X , X ; X )(X β β
Φ(X β )
∞
−
∫
+= ×   
 
po1 1 u2
p p2 o2 o2 u
po1 1
Φ(X β β
β β exp(0.5β
)
Φ
exp(X X ) )
(X β )
+
= + × × . (18) 
 
 
Equation (18) suggests a two-stage estimator.  In stage one, the hurdle parameters, 1β  can 
be estimated via conventional probit.  In stage two, the extent of participation parameters, 
2 p2 o2 uβ β β β′ ′= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  can be estimated by applying conventional nonlinear least-squares 
to the following regression version of (18): 
 
po1 1 u
p p2 o2 o2
po1 1
ˆΦ( )
Y exp
X β β
β β ωˆΦ
(X X )
(X β )
+ += + × +l , (19) 
 
 
where o2β
+  is equivalent to o2β  except that the constant term has been shifted by 2u0.5β+ , 
1β̂  denote the first-stage estimates, and ω  denotes a regression residual. 
 
Discussion 
The examples above illustrate the fact that the two-part and sample-selection 
approaches are fundamentally different.  Even though (13) and (16) [as well as (12) and 
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(18)] appear to be quite similar, they are derived from quite different primitive behavioral 
models [i.e., (14) and (15), respectively; or (14) and (17), respectively].  This strongly 
indicates that the two approaches are not nested in one another, and therefore testing a 
zero restriction on uβ  is not an adequate test to determine whether the two-part approach 
is appropriate or not.  Testing a zero restriction on uβ  does however represent a test of 
independence, and in the case of independence the restricted model will in principle yield 
more precise results.  Furthermore, the restricted model is in computational terms 
equivalent to the two-part model.  This suggests a concept of practical nesting could be 
used if one is willing to specify the primitive behavioral model. 
 These examples also illustrate that the two approaches are apparently equally 
flexible in terms of the assumptions necessary to conduct estimation.  The only 
meaningful difference, in terms of the statistical assumptions used, is the specification of 
the primitive behavioral function.  The two-part model takes a more reduced-form 
approach to estimation, while the sample-selection model takes a more structural 
approach to estimation.  The sample-selection model, though, imposes a very important 
restriction on the researcher.  In particular, to identify the parameters in (16) [or (18)], 
one must have at least one valid exclusion restriction.  In the context of health 
expenditure analyses exclusion restrictions are quite difficult to conceptualize, let alone 
obtain in data. 
Seshamani and Gray (2004) make a big deal about the fact that the implications of 
the two-part and sample-selection models can be (and are in their application) radically 
different.  One thing to bear in mind, though, is that the fundamental difference between 
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the two models—in terms of relative performance—comes down to a multi-collinearity 
issue that occurs as a result of the selectivity correction in the sample-selection model, 
but is absent from the potentially biased two-part model.  The obvious criticism with 
regard to Zweifel et al. (1999) is to point out their reliance on statistical insignificance of 
age in touting their hypothesis as “proven” is misguided, if the insignificance is due to a 
flaw in their singularly chosen econometric model.  In the reverse case one wonders 
whether a significant result produced by the sample-selection model is particularly 
impressive, since it is presumably (large sample) unbiased and likely suffers from the 
multi-collinearity problem.  Similarly, an insignificant effect, when significance is the 
(soundly reasoned) theorized result, may not be the end of the story if the sample-
selection model is misapplied.  It is in this sense that one’s best bet may be to let the data 
decide through statistical testing of the fit, or performance, of the two competing 
methods.
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CHAPTER III 
 
THE TWO-PART MODEL WITH AN ENDOGENOUS REGRESSOR 
 
 
Analyzing the causal factors contributing to health care expenditures or 
utilizations is an important endeavor in the field of health economics, replete with many 
policy implications, and associated with a rich economic theory and a number of testable 
hypotheses.  The two-part model, developed by Cragg (1971) as a flexible extension to 
the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958), has achieved considerable and persistent popularity in the 
estimation of health care expenditure or utilization models.  In this chapter, we cast the 
two-part model in the broader context of a treatment effect model (Rubin, 1974; 1977).  
We then develop an important methodological extension that facilitates estimation of 
treatment effects when treatment is endogenous due to omitted variables.  Empirical 
applications that would require such a methodology abound.  For example, if one is 
interested in the effect of health insurance on health care expenditures, then one is likely 
concerned that some unobserved factors may contribute simultaneously to the decision to 
enroll in health insurance and to the probability, and/or extent, of health care 
expenditures. 
 Despite the popularity of the two-part model, and the obvious need for a robust 
methodology adept at handling endogenous treatment effects, surprisingly few 
methodological studies have developed a two-part model extension along this line.  Our 
literature search produced only a handful of possible two-part model approaches that
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account for endogenous treatments (Welch, Frank, & Diehr, 1984; Parente & Evans, 
1998; Deb, Munkin, & Trivedi, 2006; Zheng & Zimmer, 2008; Cawley & Meyerhoefer, 
2012; Biro, 2013).  In our review we noted that none of these approaches handled the 
issue of “separability” with any level of sophistication, where by “separability” we mean 
whether the two-part model can continue to be estimated sequentially with none of the 
first-part parameters contributing to the second-part estimator, or vice versa, once 
endogeneity has been introduced.  In fact, insofar as separability was discussed in these 
studies, it was imposed as an assumption of the endogenous two-part model.  Thus our 
first contribution is to develop a new estimation protocol that extends the two-part model 
in such a way that separability can be avoided, and empirically tested for, within the 
context of endogenous treatment effects. 
 The extant literature is also limited in two other respects.  First, Welch et al. 
(1984), Parente and Evans (1998), and Deb et al. (2006) all assume that there exists some 
latent positive level of the outcome for individuals with observed zero outcomes.  This 
assumption does not comport with the conventional two-part model, and implies the 
possibility that there exists some correlation or dependence between the two parts of the 
model.  This possibility is not accounted for in the modeling strategy developed by any of 
these authors.  In contrast, we develop our two-part model extension by explicitly 
assuming no latent levels at zero at the outset.  Second, the Deb et al. (2006) two-part 
model is based on full distributional assumptions in both parts.  While this approach may 
yield efficiency gains, it introduces the possibility of bias if the distributional 
assumptions do not hold.  This is a significant drawback of their approach.  Therefore, we 
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develop a model that can be consistently estimated with fewer distributional assumptions, 
but could be straightforwardly extended to a full-information maximum likelihood 
framework if desired. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows.  In the next section, our treatment effect model 
is rigorously described.  We then develop the two-part model extension and discuss 
estimating the average treatment effect within the context of the resultant model.  Next, 
we present a simulation study that provides compelling evidence regarding the 
asymptotic properties of our new approach and demonstrates the potential bias that could 
result from ignoring the separability issue as previous approaches have.  The final section 
concludes. 
 
An Average Treatment Effect Model 
 The average treatment effect parameter described here is based on the generic 
parameter described in Terza (2014b).  The average treatment effect of a policy relevant 
dichotomous variable (e.g., whether or not a Medicare beneficiary enrolls in a 
supplementary health insurance plan) on a quantitative outcome is intuitively defined as 
the average amount by which the quantitative outcome is changed when an individual is 
treated (i.e., when an individual has supplementary health insurance).  In the canonical 
case, established by Rubin (1974, 1977), one makes use of linear regression-based 
estimation to predict two (potentially) counterfactual outcomes: the outcome that would 
occur if an individual were treated, and the outcome that would occur if an individual 
were not treated.  Rubin’s (1974, 1977) average treatment effect is defined as the 
difference between these two counterfactual outcomes.  We need to define a more precise 
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statement of the average treatment effect in the context of nonlinear regression-based 
estimation.  We can then link this precise statement of the average treatment effect with 
the two-part model. 
 With this in mind we begin with some notation and definitions.  First, we have 
framed our estimation objective in terms of a binary, policy relevant, variable.  
Henceforth we let  
Xp  denote the policy variable.  We have also framed our estimation 
objective in terms of two counterfactual outcomes.  To make the concept of a 
counterfactual outcome more concrete we first define an exogenously mandated version 
of the policy variable, and denote this exogenously mandated version of the policy 
variable as 
 
Xp
* .  Then let Y denote the observed outcome, and let 
 
Y
Xp
*  denote the 
counterfactual outcome that would occur if the policy variable were exogenously 
mandated to be 
 
Xp
* .  To describe the link between regression-based parameter estimation 
and estimation of the average treatment effect, we use a generic regression model for the 
observed outcome, Y: 
 
 
Y = µ(Xp, Xo, Xu; τ)+ e ,   (20) 
 
 
where  Xo  denotes a vector of observable confounders (i.e., variables that are correlated 
with the outcome, Y, as well as the policy variable,  
Xp ), and where  Xu  denotes a scalar 
confounder that encompasses all sources of unobserved confounding.  The function  µ( )  
denotes the conditional mean of Y given all relevant information (i.e.,  
Xp ,  Xo , and  Xu ), 
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and is a potentially nonlinear function of some unknown parameters denoted by τ .  The 
residual e is tautologically defined as the difference between Y and the conditional mean 
of Y [i.e., 
 
e ≡ Y −µ(Xp, Xo, Xu; τ) ].  By construction, the regression model specified in 
(20) is comprehensive in the sense that all sources of confounding are accounted for since 
 Xu  is included in the conditioning set.  We use this fact, and the fact that the 
exogenously mandated version of the policy variable, 
 
Xp
* , is independent of the outcome 
and all sources of confounding, to define the counterfactual version of the outcome, 
 
Y
Xp
* , 
as: 
 
 
Y
Xp
* = µ(Xp
* , Xo, Xu; τ)+ eXp*
.   (21) 
 
 
That is, in the presence of comprehensive conditioning, the conditional mean function 
provides access to the counterfactual outcome we desire. 
 The average treatment effect was described above as the difference between two 
counterfactual outcomes.  In the notation developed in the previous paragraph, we define 
the average treatment effect parameter in the nonlinear context as: 
 
 ATE = E Y1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − E Y0⎡⎣ ⎤⎦    
 
 
= EXo , Xu µ(1, Xo, Xu; τ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − EXo , Xu µ(0, Xo, Xu; τ)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,  (22) 
 
 
where our notation intends to make clear that the expectations in (22) are with respect to 
the confounding data.  Consistent estimation of the average treatment effect parameter 
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defined in (22) requires resolving two issues.  First, we must specify an appropriate 
functional form for  µ( )  (i.e., choose a particular regression-based estimator).  Second, 
we must determine how to deal with the presence of the unobserved confounder,  Xu .  
The two-part model constitutes a particular assumption regarding the correct functional 
form for  µ( ) .  In the next section we describe our approach to handling the presence of 
 Xu  (or, alternatively, our approach to handling the endogeneity of  
Xp ) within the 
confines of a two-part model.  We then are prepared to revisit the problem of estimating 
equation (22) consistently. 
 
Endogenous Treatment in the Two-Part Model Context 
 The conventional two-part model features two components that are typically 
referred to as the hurdle and levels components.  The hurdle component models the 
dichotomous outcome: Y is either observed with a value of zero or Y is observed with a 
strictly positive value.  The levels component models the positive observed outcomes, 
conditional on the outcome being positive.  Let H denote the hurdle outcome and let  Yℓ  
denote the levels outcome.  We specify these components as follows:5 
 
 
H = I(Xpβp1 + Xoβo1 + Xuβu1 + ε1 > 0)   (23) 
 
                                                
5 Note that the levels components specified here is equivalent to that employed by Duan, 
Manning, Morris, and Newhouse (1983).  It is presented on a raw scale rather than a log scale, though.  We 
adopt this approach to avoid the retransformation problem.  See Abrevaya (2002), Ai and Norton (2000, 
2008), Barber and Thompson (2004), Basu and Manning (2009), Blough, Madden, and Hornbrook (1999), 
Miller (1984), Duan (1983), Manning (1998), Manning, Basu, and Mullahy (2005), Manning and Mullahy 
(2001), Mullahy (1998), and Taylor (1986), Zhou, Gao, and Hui (1997) for details about the 
retransformation problem and available solutions.  It is our contention that the retransformation problem 
has no solution that rivals an avoidance solution. 
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Yℓ = exp(Xpβp2 + Xoβo2 + Xuβu2 + ε2 )   (24) 
 
 
where I(C) denotes the indicator function, which reports one if condition C is true and 
zero otherwise.  We assume that there are no latent levels at zero so that the levels 
outcome,  Yℓ , is only defined if H = 1.  At a minimum we impose the following two 
assumptions on the model as stated thus far: 1) a probit assumption for the hurdle 
component: 
 
 
(ε1 | Xp,Xo,Xu ) ~ N(0,1) ,   (25) 
 
 
and 2) the following conditional mean assumption: 
 
 
E exp(ε2 ) | Xp,Xo,Xu ,H = 1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 1.   (26) 
 
 
A logistic assumption could easily replace the normality assumption [equation (25)].  The 
normality assumption is typical in the context of binary outcome models though, and 
turns out to be especially convenient in the present example.  Assumption 2) is minimally 
parametric in the sense that it suggests a nonlinear least-squares estimator, which is 
relatively more robust than a model based on full distributional assumptions regarding ε2 . 
Based on the two components of the model [i.e., on the basis of equations (23) 
and (24)], and based on the assumption of no latent levels at zero, the outcome, Y, can be 
written as follows: 
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Y =
0 if H = 0
exp(Xpβp2 + Xoβo2 + Xuβu2 + ε2 ) if H = 1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
.  (27) 
 
 
Typically when the two-part model is applied, it is posited that 
 
 
E Y | Xp,Xo,Xu⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Φ(Xpβp1 + Xoβo1 + Xuβu1)exp(Xpβp2 + Xoβo2 + Xuβu2 ) .  (28) 
 
 
However, this implicitly assumes that there are some latent levels at zero (see Terza, 
2014b).  We follow the practice proposed by Terza (2014b), and use the following 
conditional mean expression: 
 
 
E Y | Xp,Xo,Xu⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = H × exp(Xpβp2 + Xoβo2 + Xuβu2 )   (29) 
 
 
in our formulation of the average treatment effect.  This approach is logically compatible 
with the no latent levels at zero assumption.  Equation (29) leads naturally to the 
following average treatment effect parameter: 
 
 
ATE = EXo ,Xu I(βp1 + Xoβo1 + Xuβu1 + ε1 > 0)exp(βp2 + Xoβo2 + Xuβu2 )
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦   
 
 
−EXo ,Xu I(Xoβo1 + Xuβu1 + ε1 > 0)exp(Xoβo2 + Xuβu2 )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,  (30) 
 
 
where we have replace H with its data generating equation.  We have also tested, and 
prefer, an alternative that makes use of the fact that the best prediction for 
 
Y
Xp
*  when an 
 35 
individual is treated is the observed outcome, Y.  That is, we have tested an average 
treatment effect estimator based on the following: 
 
 
ATE = EXo ,Xu
!!Y1 − !!Y0⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,   (31) 
 
 
where 
 
 
!!Y
Xp
* =
Y if Xp = Xp
*
I(Xp
*βp1 + Xoβo1 + Xuβu1 + ε1 > 0)exp(Xp
*βp2 + Xoβo2 + Xuβu2 ) if Xp ≠ Xp
*
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
  
  (32) 
 
 
 The discussion above serves to define the average treatment effect parameter in 
the two-part model context.  To proceed with estimating the average treatment effect we 
need to estimate the two-part model parameters and deal with the fact that  Xu  is 
unobserved.  To derive a consistent estimator for the two-part model parameters we adopt 
the generic approach developed in Terza (2009).  Specifically, let  W1  denote a vector of 
identifying instrumental variables, and let 
 
W = W1 Xo⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  denote the full set of 
exogenous variables.6  Then assume that the policy variable is generated as follows: 
 
 
Xp = I(Wα + Xu > 0) ,   (33) 
 
 
 
                                                
6 Note that the model is just-identified when  W1 ∈!  and is over-identified when  W1 ∈!
k . 
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where  (Xu | W) ~ N(0,1) .  The probit assumption for the hurdle component and the 
probit assumption in (33) can be combined to derive a bivariate probit model that can 
consistently estimate the parameters α  and 
 
β1
′ = βp1 βo1
′ βu1⎡⎣
⎤
⎦ .  To see this, note that 
by appealing to the argument in Terza and Tsai (2006), one can re-parameterize the 
hurdle component as follows.7  Let 
 
 
γ p1 = βp1 1−ρ
2 ,   (34) 
 
 γ o1 = βo1 1−ρ
2 ,   (35) 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
ρ =
βu1
1+βu1
2
.   (36) 
 
 
Then 
 
 
H = I(Xpγ p1 + Xoγ o1 + υ > 0)    (37) 
 
 
can be used in place of the hurdle equation specified in (23), and it can be shown that, 
conditional on W, the errors  Xu  and υ  are standard bivariate normally distributed with 
correlation ρ .  Thus the parameters can be consistently estimated by applying 
                                                
7 Wooldridge (2010) demonstrates a similar result as well (see pages 594-95 of his text). 
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conventional bivariate probit analysis to equations (33) and (37).  The original parameters 
can be obtained by re-transforming via equations (34) through (36). 
 Since the levels component of the two-part model is defined only when H = 1, we 
can formulate an estimator for the parameters of the levels equation on the basis of a 
conditional mean expression for Y conditional on H = 1.  It can be shown under the 
assumptions made thus far that8 
 
 
E Y | Xp,W,H = 1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = Xp
−Wα
∞∫ Φ(Xβ1)exp(Xβ2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu
−Wα
∞∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
  
 
 
+(1− Xp )
−∞
−Wα∫ Φ(Xβ1)exp(Xβ2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu
−∞
−Wα∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
,  (38) 
 
 
where 
 
X = Xp Xo Xu⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ .    The conditional mean in (22) can serve as the basis for a 
nonlinear least-squares estimator since the unobserved confounder,  Xu , is “integrated 
out” so that  Xu  is not a conditioning variable.  The integrals in (22) have no closed form 
solution, but can be approximated via Monte Carlo integration or Gauss-Legendre 
quadrature after applying an appropriate change of variables (see Appendix B).  On the 
basis of (22) the following two-stage estimator is consistent for the full set of parameters. 
Stage 1: Estimate α  and  β1  via conventional bivariate probit analysis as 
suggested above.  Stage 2: Estimate  β2  by applying nonlinear least squares to: 
 
                                                
8 See Appendix B. 
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Y = Xpi
−Wiα̂
∞∫ Φ(Xiβ̂1)exp(Xiβ2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu
−Wiα̂
∞∫ Φ(Xiβ̂1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
  
 
 
+(1− Xpi)
−∞
−Wiα̂∫ Φ(Xiβ̂1)exp(Xiβ2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu
−∞
−Wiα̂∫ Φ(Xiβ̂1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
+ω i ,  (39) 
 
 
using the subsample of observations for whom H = 1.  The “ s” in (39) denote first-stage 
estimates and  ω i  is a regression error term.  Appendix B provides mathematical details 
needed for constructing an optimization algorithm for the second-stage.  The asymptotic 
properties of this two-stage estimator can be obtained as described in Terza (2014c).  
They are also detailed in Appendix B. 
 To complete the discussion we need to describe a consistent estimator for the 
average treatment effect parameter defined in (31).  With consistent estimates for all of 
the model parameters it is fairly straightforward to replace the population moments in 
(31) with sample analogs.  The main difficulty is that  Xu  remains in these expressions.  
Thus proceeding from (31) we can use the law of iterated expectations to write: 
 
 
ATE = EXo −∞
∞∫ ( !!Y1 − !!Y0 )ϕ(Xu )dXu⎡⎣
⎤
⎦ ,  (40) 
 
 
which can be replaced with the following consistent estimator: 
 
 
ATE! = ∑ 1
n −∞
∞∫ ""̂Y1 − ""̂Y0{ }ϕ(Xu )dXu⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥ ,  (41) 
 
 
 !
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where 
 
!!̂Y
Xp
*  denotes the estimated version of (32), where as described by Terza (2014a), 
one replaces the error term  ε1  with pseudo-random variates drawn from the standard 
normal distribution.  The integrals in (41) can also be approximated via Monte Carlo 
integration or Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
 The discussion above makes clear that the hurdle parameters enter into the levels 
estimator when endogeneity is introduced in the conventional two-part model.  Therefore 
we conclude that it is not generally true that separability is an appropriate imposition 
once endogeneity has been introduced.  This is the inherent weakness involved with the 
approaches developed by Welch et al. (1984), Parente and Evans (1998), and Zheng and 
Zimmer (2008).  It can be seen, however, that separable estimation constitutes a 
consistent approach if  βu1 = 0 .  This is demonstrated straightforwardly by noting that if 
 βu1 = 0 , then the following conditional mean expression obtains: 
 
 
E Y | Xp,W,H = 1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = exp(Xpβp2 + Xoβo2
+ )   
 
 
× Xp
Φ(βu2 + Wα)
Φ(Wα)
+ (1− Xp )
1−Φ(βu2 + Wα)
1−Φ(Wα)
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 (42) 
 
 
where  βo2
+  is equivalent to  βo2  except that the constant term is shifted by  0.5βu2
2 .9  
Clearly the hurdle parameters are absent from (42).  On the basis of equation (42) the 
following three-stage alternative is consistent for the full set of parameters. 
                                                
9 See Appendix E. 
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 Stage 1: Estimate α  by applying conventional probit analysis to equation (33) 
using the full sample.  Stage 2: Estimate  
βp1  and  βo1  by applying conventional probit 
analysis to equation (23) using the full sample, and setting  βu1 = 0 .  Stage 3: Estimate  β2  
by applying nonlinear least-squares to the following regression version of (42): 
 
 
Yi = exp(Xpiβp2 + Xoiβo2
+ )    
 
 
× Xpi
Φ(βu2 + Wiα̂)
Φ(Wiα̂)
+ (1− Xpi)
1−Φ(βu2 + Wiα̂)
1−Φ(Wiα̂)
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
+ ζi ,  (43) 
 
 
using the subsample of observations for whom H = 1, where  α̂  denotes the first-stage 
estimate of α  and  ζi  is a regression error term. 
 Stages 1 and 3 constitute a more general version of the two-stage estimator 
suggested by Terza (1994, 1998) and comprise a special case of the generic method 
introduced by Terza (1996, 2009).  Although there are three stages to this estimator it is 
relatively simple compared to the two-stage estimator describe previously since the 
methods applied at the first two stages are conventional, widely packaged routines, and 
the method applied at stage three is a simpler nonlinear least-squares objective function 
than the one given in (39).  It is worth noting that  βu1 = 0  if and only if  ρ = 0 .  Thus a 
test of whether the three-stage estimator is preferred over the two-stage estimator can be 
conducted by estimating the first-stage of our two-stage estimator and testing the null 
hypothesis that  ρ = 0 . 
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 The average treatment effect parameter when  βu1 = 0  is slightly different also.  In 
this case we can show that the following is appropriate: 
 
 
ATE0 = EXo
⌣
Y1 −
⌣
Y0⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,   (44) 
 
 
where 
 
 
⌣
Y
Xp
* =
Y if Xp = Xp
*
I(Xp
*βp1 + Xoβo1 + ε1 > 0)exp(Xp
*βp2 + Xoβo2
+ ) if Xp ≠ Xp
*
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
.  (45) 
 
 
The sample analog estimator in this case is 
 
 
ATE! 0 = ∑
1
n
⌣̂
Y1 −
⌣̂
Y0
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
,   (46) 
 
 
where 
 
⌣̂
Y
Xp
*  denotes the estimated version of (45), and where we replace the error term  ε1  
with pseudo-random variates drawn from the standard normal distribution. 
 
Simulation Analysis of the New Methodology 
 To test the performance of our new methodological approach we simulated data 
and applied our estimator alongside a candidate comparison estimator.  The comparison 
estimator closely aligns with the approaches taken by Welch, Frank, and Diehr (1984), 
Parente and Evans (1998), Zheng and Zimmer (2008), Cawley and Meyerhoefer (2012), 
and Biro (2013).  In particular, we apply first-, and second-, part estimators that would 
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adequately account for the inclusion of  Xu  if each of the parts were considered in 
isolation from the other.  That is, if the two parts retained their separability after 
endogeneity is introduced, then this approach would be consistent.  We refer to the 
comparison estimator as the naïve TPM henceforth.  The naïve TPM comprises of the 
following two stages. 
Stage 1: Estimate α  and 
 
γ ′ = γ p1 γ o1
′⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦   (and ρ ) by applying conventional 
bivariate probit analysis to equations (33) and (37) using the full sample.   β1  can be 
obtained by using (34) through (36).  (Note that this is equivalent to the first-stage of our 
proposed estimation protocol.)  Stage 2: Estimate  β2   as described with Stage 3 of the 
3S2PT model above.  Stage 2 is consistent if the conditional mean is (42), which we 
showed is not generally true.  We apply the same average treatment effect estimator as 
described with our consistent two-stage approach, but use the inconsistent second-stage 
estimates. 
 The Monte Carlo study we conducted is based on the following data generating 
process. The exogenous data vector, W, was obtained as independent pseudo-random 
draws from uniform distributions with means set to 0.5 and 0.25 and variances set to 4 
and 2, respectively.  Once the exogenous data were obtained we generated the policy 
variable,  
Xp , and the hurdle outcome, H, according to the data generating equations: 
 
 
Xp = I(Wα + Xu > 0) ,   (47) 
 
 
and 
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H = I(Xpβp1 + Xoβo1 + Xuβu1 + ε1 > 0) ,  (48) 
 
 
where  Xu  and  ε1  were obtained as draws from independent standard normal 
distributions.  Finally the levels outcome was obtained as a draw from the generalized 
gamma distribution with parameters  σ = 0.5 ,  κ = 0.25 , and 
 
 
µ = exp(Xpβp2 + Xoβo2 + Xuβu2 ) .   (49) 
 
 
This is the parameterization of the generalized gamma distribution described by 
Manning, Basu, and Mullahy (2005).  Manning et al. (2005) show that under this data 
generating process the conditional mean is 
 
 
E Yℓ | Xp,Xo,Xu⎡⎣
⎤
⎦ = exp(Xβ2 + f{σ,κ}) ,  (50) 
 
 
where 
 
 
f{σ,κ}= σ
κ
ln(κ2 )+ ln Γ 1
κ2
+ σ
κ
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
− ln Γ 1
κ2
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
,  (51) 
 
 
where  Γ{ } denotes the gamma function.  The outcome, Y, was set to equal zero 
whenever H = 0, and equal to  Yℓ  whenever H = 1.  The estimator we apply in our Monte 
Carlo study does not make use of the knowledge that the levels outcome is distributed 
generalized gamma.  Thus the constant term in the second-stage of our consistent 
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estimator is actually converging to the “true” constant term plus  f{σ,κ} .  We correct for 
this when we present our results. 
 We conducted two Monte Carlo studies with samples of size 100,000 and 50 
replications each.  The first Monte Carlo study sets  βu1 = 2.00  so that our estimator is 
consistent but the naïve TPM is not consistent.  In terms of the first stage estimator that is 
common across both approaches setting  βu1 = 2.00  implies a correlation of 0.9.  Thus 
this data generating process is a fairly extreme case and gives a worst-case picture of the 
naïve TPM.  The second Monte Carlo study sets  βu1 = 0.00 .  The naïve TPM should 
perform very similar to the 2S2PT estimator. 
 Table 1 presents results from these two studies.  The 2S2PT estimator is 
consistent under both Monte Carlo scenarios.  The naïve TPM is inconsistent under the 
first Monte Carlo study.  The absolute percent bias (APB) for the average treatment effect 
is 50.37%, which is similar in magnitude to the biases associated with  
βp2  and  βo2 .  The 
naïve TPM performs very well, and similarly to the 2S2PT estimator, under the second 
Monte Carlo scenario. 
 
Discussion 
 The conventional TPM remains a popular model in the estimation of health care 
expenditures.  Many health economic questions require modeling health care 
expenditures with an endogenous right-hand side dummy variable.  Despite the
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Table 1 
 
Results from a Simulation Analysis 
 
 βu1 ≠ 0  βu1 = 0 
 True 
Values 
2S2PTa Naïve 
TPM 
 True 
Values 
2S2PTa Naïve 
TPM 
ATE:        
Xp 1.56 1.57 2.34  1.60 1.61 1.61 
  (0.81) (50.37)   (0.71) (0.60) 
  [0.03] [0.63]   [0.04] [0.04] 
Policy Variable:        
W1 0.50 0.50   0.50 0.50  
  (0.19)    (0.04)  
  [0.00]    [0.00]  
Xo 0.50 0.50   0.50 0.50  
  (0.09)    (0.02)  
  [0.00]    [0.00]  
Constant 0.50 0.50   0.50 0.50  
  (0.16)    (0.01)  
  [0.00]    [0.00]  
Hurdle Outcome:        
Xp 0.50 0.50   0.50 0.51  
  (0.23)    (1.26)  
  [0.00]    [0.00]  
Xo 0.50 0.50   0.50 0.50  
  (0.13)    (0.34)  
  [0.00]    [0.00]  
Xu 2.00 2.01   0.00 -0.00  
  (0.31)    (NA)  
  [0.00]    [0.00]  
Constant 0.50 0.50   0.50 0.50  
  (0.32)    (0.88)  
  [0.00]    [0.00]  
Levels Outcome:        
Xp 0.50 0.50 0.75  0.50 0.51 0.50 
  (0.99) (50.73)   (1.05) (0.89) 
  [0.00] [0.07]   [0.01] [0.01] 
Xo 0.50 0.50 0.47  0.50 0.50 0.50 
  (0.19) (5.29)   (0.11) (0.13) 
  [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] 
Xu 0.50 0.49 0.24  0.50 0.50 0.50 
  (1.05) (52.87)   (0.76) (0.68) 
  [0.00] [0.07]   [0.00] [0.00] 
Constant 0.50 0.50 0.49  0.50 0.50 0.50 
  (0.08) (1.07)   (0.98) (0.92) 
  [0.00] [0.00]   [0.00] [0.00] 
Observations: 100,000 
Replications: 50 
a 2S2PT: Our two-stage two-part treatment effect estimator. 
Absolute percent bias in parentheses. 
Mean squared error in square brackets. 
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popularity of the TPM, and the overwhelming need for appropriate methodology to 
handle dummy endogenous regressors, little methodological research has been conducted 
toward this end.  We have derived a novel approach to handling dummy endogenous 
regressors within the context of the TPM.  Our approach improves upon the extant 
approaches in that it comports more closely with the conventional TPM approach and 
because it relies on relatively few distributional assumptions thereby making it robust to 
distributional misspecification. 
 Our simulation analysis demonstrates that naïve TPM approaches to accounting 
for endogeneity in TPMs is not adequate.  In fact significant biases exist with both the 
slope parameters and with a typical post-estimation treatment effect parameter.  
Furthermore, we demonstrated that a testable restriction can be imposed such that naïve 
approaches as well as our approach will be consistent.  This provides applied researchers 
with the necessary statistical testing procedures so that one can determine the best 
modeling approach.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
MEDICARE PART D AND THE USE OF HOSPITAL SERVICES 
 
 
Prescription medicines represent a clinically important component in the 
treatment of a variety of illnesses.  This is especially true among the chronically ill and 
elderly.  Furthermore, drug spending accounts for a large and expanding proportion of 
total medical expenditures among both of these groups.  Stagnitti (2007) reports that 
prescription drug spending accounted for approximately 20% of total medical 
expenditure in 2004, which represents a marked increase from 13% in 1997.  In the years 
preceding the implementation of Medicare Part D a substantial number of Medicare 
beneficiaries were without prescription drug coverage.  Safran et al. (2005) estimate that 
approximately 27% of seniors were without medication insurance in 2003 and that many 
of these uninsured seniors were poor or near poor.  Concerns regarding the health and 
financial well being of the uninsured provided impetus for the passage of the Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, the legislative 
foundation for Part D. 
 In the health services research literature a hypothesis important to the evaluation 
of Medicare Part D has emerged known as the “cost-offset” hypothesis.10 This hypothesis
                                                
10 See Briesacher, Stuart, Ren, and Doshi (2005), Sokol, McGuigan, Verbrugge, and Epstein 
(2005), Hsu et al., 2006; Shang and Goldman (2007), Deb, Trivedi, and Zimmer (2009), Stuart, Doshi, and 
Terza (2009), Zhang, Donohue, Lave, O’Donnell, and Newhouse (2009), Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight 
(2010), Afendulis, Zaslavsky, and Chernew (2011), Liu et al., 2011; McWilliams, Zaslavsky, and Huskamp 
(2011), Kaestner and Khan (2012), and Kaestner, Long, and Alexander (2014). 
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proposes that Part D may reduce the use of non-drug medical resources, and thereby 
mitigate the cost of the drug insurance program.  The rationale behind this hypothesis is 
that drug insurance could positively affect medication adherence, and consequently 
decrease the likelihood of adverse health events that would have otherwise led to the use 
of hospital and/or physician services.  Evidence in support of the cost-offset hypothesis 
has been used to claim that Medicare Part D has improved the health of beneficiaries 
(e.g., MAPRx Coalition, 2013).  A negative relationship between Part D and the use of 
hospital services could also indicate a substitution across medical services without a 
corresponding change in health, however. 
 Understanding the relationship between Part D and hospital utilizations is 
particularly relevant in assessing the costs and benefits associated with Medicare Part D.  
On the cost side, if Part D insurance negatively impacts the use of other health care 
services, then the calculated cost of the program should be adjusted to reflect the savings 
associated with a diminished use of these services.  On the benefit side, a negative 
relationship between Part D and the use of non-drug medical resources may indicate that 
Part D has an important effect on the health of beneficiaries.  In broader terms of 
economic efficiency, Goldman and Philipson (2007) argue that the degree of 
substitutability across multiple insured medical technologies is an important factor in 
determining the optimal cost-sharing arrangement.  Thus additional knowledge regarding 
the extent to which drugs are substituted for hospital resources could help policymakers 
increase the cost-effectiveness of Medicare. 
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 Previous studies have attempted to link prescription drug use or coverage with a 
change in patient health,11 to link prescription drug insurance to changes in drug use or 
expenditure,12 and to link prescription drug use or coverage with the use of other health 
care services.13 Among these latter studies the literature broadly supports the conclusion 
that drug coverage reduces the use of other health care services (see Congressional 
Budget Office, 2012).  More research is necessary, however, to precisely determine the 
magnitude of the relationship between Part D and the use of non-drug medical care (see 
Lau and Stubbings, 2012).  Furthermore, no study has attempted to holistically 
investigate the relationships between drug coverage, health, and the use of hospital 
services.  The first contribution of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which 
changes in health explain the relationship between Part D and the number of 
hospitalizations.14 
 The second contribution is a focus on the previously uninsured.  Despite the 
obvious policy relevance of this group, little research has directly analyzed the effect of 
Medicare Part D among these beneficiaries.  Briesacher et al. (2005), Zhang et al. (2009), 
and McWilliams et al. (2011) are the only studies reviewed that provide point estimates 
                                                
11 See Lichtenberg (1996; 2001) and Heisler et al. (2004). 
12 See Lichtenberg and Sun (2007), Shea, Terza, Stuart, Briesacher (2007), Simoni-Wastila, 
Zuckerman, Shaffer, Blanchette, and Stuart (2008), Yin et al., 2008; Schneeweiss et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 
2009; Basu, Yin, and Alexander (2010), Duggan and Morton (2010), Polinski, Kilabuk, Schneeweiss, 
Brennan, and Shrank (2010), Safran et al., 2010; and Briesacher et al., 2011 for studies that have looked at 
changes in expenditures or uses of prescription drugs. See also Piette, Wagner, Potter, and Schillinger 
(2004), Goldman et al. (2004), Soumerai et al. (2006), Madden et al. (2008), Madden, Graves, Ross-
Degnan, Briesacher, and Soumerai (2009), Polinski, Donohue, Kilabuk, and Shrank (2011), and Williams, 
Steers, Ettner, Mangione, and Duru (2013) for studies that have looked for changes in medication 
adherence. 
13 See the references in footnote 1. 
14 In the psychometric literature investigating the extent to which a third variable explains the 
causal relationship between two variables is referred to as a mediation analysis.  See Baron and Kenny 
(1986), Judd and Kenny (1981), and James and Brett (1984). 
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associated with the previously un-, or under-, insured.  Moreover, among these studies, 
Briesacher et al.'s study is the only one that focuses solely on drug coverage “gainers” 
versus “nevers,” and their study may not sufficiently reflect the experiences of Part D 
“gainers” as opposed to “gainers” of pre-Part D drug coverage plans.  In this chapter I 
estimate separate parameters for respondents that reported limited or no drug coverage in 
all survey waves before 2006 and for respondents that reported generous coverage in at 
least one survey wave before 2006. 
 
Background 
 Analyses of disease-specific populations indicate a strong negative association 
between prescription drug coverage (or use) and the use of hospital services.  Sokol et al. 
(2005) estimated the effect that medication adherence has on the probability of being 
hospitalized among samples of patients with one of four health conditions.15  They found 
that medication adherence, derived from data on prescription drug fills, strongly affects 
the probability of being hospitalized.  For instance, they estimated that diabetes patients 
with more than 80% adherence are 17 percentage points less likely to be hospitalized than 
diabetes patients with less than 20% adherence.  Cole et al. (2006) estimated the effect of 
increasing prescription drug co-payments on the risk of hospitalization for patients with 
chronic heart failure.  They found that, depending on the medication regimen, the 
probability of hospitalization increases between 6 and 9% for every $10 increase in drug 
co-payment.  Afendulis et al. (2011) analyzed state-level data on the number of 
                                                
15 Diabetes, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, and congestive heart failure. 
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hospitalizations associated with eight illnesses.16  They compared the changes in the 
hospitalization rates associated with these illnesses across states with “high” and “low” 
Part D take-up rates.  They found that Part D is associated with a 4.1% reduction in the 
hospitalization rates associated with these illnesses.  These studies do not 
straightforwardly generalize to the Medicare beneficiary population because of the 
selected nature of the study populations used and because these analyses are primarily 
descriptive. 
 Studies that use proprietary insurance data are uniquely capable of identifying the 
role that drug coverage versus drug use plays in the relationship between prescription 
drug insurance and the use of physician or hospital services.  Furthermore, these studies 
have clear sources of identifying variation lending them increased causal interpretability.  
Hsu et al. (2006) analyzed the effect of capping drug benefits at $1,000 per year.  They 
report that capping benefits increased the number of emergency department visits by 9%, 
and increased the number of non-elective hospitalizations by 13%.  Zhang et al. (2009) 
compared spending outcomes before and after the implementation of Medicare Part D 
among a group of beneficiaries enrolled in a “large Pennsylvania insurer.”  They found 
that those individuals with limited drug coverage before Part D experienced offsetting 
decreases in non-drug medical spending.  Chandra et al. (2010) used data on Medicare 
beneficiaries receiving supplementary insurance through California Public Employees 
Retirement System.  They compared physician and hospital utilizations across 
                                                
16 Short-term complications of diabetes, uncontrolled diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disorder, congestive heart failure, angina, asthma, stroke, and acute myocardial infarction. 
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beneficiaries that experienced drug co-payment increases and those that did not.  They 
concluded that cost-offsets are possible. 
 Though the aforementioned studies suggest strong cost-offset effects associated 
with Part D, concerns regarding the external validity of these results remain.  Thus it is 
important to also consider evidence produced by nationally representative studies.  Shang 
and Goldman (2007) and Deb et al. (2009) employed robust methodology and found 
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between prescription drug insurance 
and non-drug medical expenditure.  However, these studies produced radically different 
point estimates.  Shang and Goldman estimated that for every dollar spent on drug 
coverage Medicare saves approximately $2.06 on Part A and B expenditures.  
Accordingly, their results imply that the net cost of Medicare Part D is negative.  Deb et 
al., on the other hand, found that the cost-offsets resulting from drug insurance are less 
than dollar-for-dollar, implying a positive net cost of Part D.  Kaestner and Khan (2012) 
conducted a descriptive analysis that did not indicate any significant relationship between 
Part D and non-drug medical spending.  Liu et al. (2011) employed a differences-in-
differences model with a small sample (N= 1,105), and estimated a small and statistically 
insignificant positive relationship between drug coverage and emergency department and 
hospital use.  Kaestner et al. (2014) found that Part D reduced hospital admissions by 8%. 
 Two additional studies are very similar to mine: a study conducted by Briesacher 
et al. (2005) and a study conducted by McWilliams et al. (2011).  Briesacher et al. (2005) 
provide prospective evidence of the effect of gaining Part D coverage on hospital and 
physician spending by comparing drug coverage “gainers” with drug coverage “nevers” 
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in the pre-Part D era.  They estimated a fixed-effects differences-in-differences model, 
and found small and statistically insignificant effects.  McWilliams et al. (2011) 
investigated whether individuals with limited or no drug coverage before 2006 had a 
greater reduction in health care expenditures in post-2006 quarters relative to those 
individuals with generous drug coverage before 2006.  They found that those with limited 
or no drug coverage before 2006 had a relative reduction in total non-drug medical 
spending of $306 per quarter.  The majority of this reduction was driven by changes in 
inpatient and skilled nursing facility expenditures. 
 I extend both of the latter two analyses by using an extended panel data set, and 
by employing a more robust econometric methodology.  Furthermore, my study is the 
first among all of the aforementioned studies to investigate the role that health plays as a 
potential mechanism that could explain the negative relationship between Part D and non-
drug health care utilizations/expenditures.  Briesacher et al. (2005), Zhang et al. (2009), 
and McWilliams et al. (2011) are the only studies that provide evidence regarding the 
effect of Part D among beneficiaries who had limited or no drug coverage prior to the 
implementation of Part D.  This chapter provides new evidence of the effect of Part D 
among the previously uninsured.  I also provide evidence of the effect of Part D among 
beneficiaries that switch from generous pre-Part D drug coverage to Part D insurance. 
 
Data 
 The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is sponsored by the National Institute on 
Aging (grant number NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of 
Michigan.  The HRS survey was first conducted in 1992, and has been conducted every 
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two years thereafter.  The HRS is representative of the over-50 population of American 
residents.  The Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Study (AHEAD) is a 
companion study conducted by the University of Michigan and sponsored by the same 
NIA grant.  The AHEAD survey was administered separately from the HRS survey until 
1998 when the samples from the HRS and AHEAD were merged and tracked thereafter 
as a part of the HRS.  The majority of the analysis variables I use were constructed using 
raw HRS data or AHEAD data from the 1995 survey,17 but a handful of the control 
variables come from a file constructed by the RAND Corporation.18  The RAND HRS 
data file is an easy-to-use longitudinal data set derived from raw HRS data. It was 
developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the Social 
Security Administration. 
 The data used in this chapter consist of a panel covering the years 1996 through 
2010.  28,261 respondents were interviewed over this time period.  The primary sample 
inclusion criterion is enrollment in Medicare Parts A and B.19  Enrollment in both parts is 
a prerequisite for enrollment in Medicare Part D.  After omitting respondents not enrolled 
in both Part A and B, the sample included 21,922 individuals. 
 The dependent variables derive from questions that elicit the number of 
utilizations that occurred over the past two years or since the previous interview, 
whichever is longer.  Therefore, I omitted all observations on respondents that ever 
                                                
17 Approximately half of the respondents included in my 1996 cross-section come from the 1995 
AHEAD survey. 
18 Specifically, the following measures were derived from the RAND file: age, marital status, 
household income, education, gender, race, and geographic region. 
19 Alternatively, a survey respondent can be included in my sample if they are enrolled in a 
Medicare Advantage plan.  In my analyses of Part D I include Medicare Advantage prescription drug plan 
holders with Part D enrollees. 
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skipped an interview to ensure that the dependent variables were measured over the same 
length of time across respondents.  Under this inclusion criterion individuals who died or 
were permanently dropped from the HRS study are retained.  Less than 1,000 
respondents in my final analysis sample died.  After omitting respondents that ever 
skipped an interview, the sample included 17,974 individuals. 
 Only 15,534 of the remaining respondents reported their Part D status at each of 
the post-Part D interviews.  At each survey wave the HRS instrument asks respondents to 
report whether they have ever been diagnosed with several physical health conditions.  
Some records indicate that a respondent has been diagnosed with a particular health 
condition in an early wave, but at a later wave has never been diagnosed with that 
condition.  Since a secondary focus is the role that health plays in the relationship 
between Part D and the use of hospital services, I omit respondents with this type of 
inconsistent record.  After making this omission, the sample included 13,726 individuals.  
Finally, after omitting respondents with missing left- or right-hand side variables the 
sample included 10,075 individuals.  To assess whether any of the sample restrictions are 
responsible for the results, I compared the pre-restricted sample to the final analysis 
sample along all observed dimensions.  There were no substantial differences in the 
means across these two samples. 
 Two variables were derived to measure hospital utilizations.  The first variable 
measures the number of inpatient stays occurring over a two-year period.  The second 
variable measures the number of hospital nights occurring over this same length of time.  
The primary regression controls include age, household income, marital status, education,
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent and Demographic Variables 
 
 Full Sample  FE Sample 
 Mean 
(Overall SD) 
 Mean 
(Overall SD) Within SD 
Inpatient Stays 0.59  0.82 1.06 
 (1.28)  (1.37)  
Hospital Nights 3.15  4.20 9.94 
 (11.58)  (12.35)  
Age 74.22  74.90 3.03 
 (6.85)  (6.81)  
Log(Household Income) 10.27  10.25 0.47 
 (0.95)  (0.92)  
Married 0.59  0.57 0.19 
 (0.49)  (0.49)  
Nonwhite 0.14  0.13 - 
 (0.35)  (0.33)  
Female 0.61  0.61 - 
 (0.49)  (0.49)  
High School Graduate 0.38  0.38 - 
 (0.48)  (0.48)  
Some College 0.20  0.19 - 
 (0.40)  (0.39)  
College or Beyond 0.18  0.18 - 
 (0.39)  (0.39)  
Other Drug Coverage 0.31  0.30 0.33 
 (0.46)  (0.46)  
HMO 0.21  0.21 0.23 
 (0.41)  (0.41)  
Medicaid 0.07  0.07 0.13 
 (0.26)  (0.26)  
CHAMPUS 0.05  0.05 0.14 
 (0.22)  (0.22)  
Medigap 0.63  0.65 0.28 
 (0.48)  (0.48)  
Northeast 0.16  0.16 0.05 
 (0.36)  (0.36)  
Midwest 0.27  0.28 0.05 
 (0.44)  (0.45)  
South 0.39  0.38 0.07 
 (0.49)  (0.49)  
Observations: 30650  19495  
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race, gender, and a set of indicators to control for the set of health insurance contracts 
held.  All econometric models also include region and year fixed effects.  Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics for the outcome measures, and the primary regression 
controls. 
 Several proxy measures were derived to characterize respondent's health: in 
particular, measures associated with physical health conditions, measures indicating the 
respondent's degree of functional limitation, and measures indicating the respondent's 
mental health status.  The physical health conditions include hypertension, diabetes, 
cancer (excluding skin cancer), lung disease (excluding asthma), stroke, arthritis, and 
heart disease.  For each of these conditions, I derived an indicator that reports whether the 
respondent has ever been diagnosed with the condition and it is “active.”  For example, 
the hypertension variable indicates if the respondent has ever been diagnosed with 
hypertension and it is not under control.  This variable takes a zero value if the 
respondent has never been diagnosed with hypertension or if the respondent has been 
diagnosed with hypertension in the past but it is now under control.  In all models I use a 
count of the number of these “active” health conditions because the majority of 
conditions had too little within variation to be used in the fixed effects specifications. 
 To measure functional limitations I use an activities of daily living (ADL) score 
and an instrumental activities of daily living (IADL) score.  The ADL score counts how 
many of the following tasks the respondent has difficulty performing: walking across a 
room, dressing oneself, bathing oneself, eating, and getting into or out of bed.  The IADL
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for the Health Measures 
 
 Full Sample  FE Sample 
 Mean 
(Overall SD) 
 Mean 
(Overall SD) Within SD 
ADL 0.27  0.30 0.47 
 (0.76)  (0.79)  
IADL 0.08  0.08 0.24 
 (0.34)  (0.34)  
CESD 1.41  1.50 1.11 
 (1.84)  (1.88)  
Number of Active Conditionsa 0.57  0.63 0.49 
 (0.82)  (0.86)  
Hypertension (not under control) 0.02  0.02 0.11 
 (0.13)  (0.13)  
Diabetes (not under control) 0.01  0.01 0.08 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  
Cancer (in treatment) 0.08  0.07 0.10 
 (0.27)  (0.26)  
Lung Disease (limits activity) 0.04  0.05 0.12 
 (0.20)  (0.21)  
Stroke (problems persist) 0.03  0.03 0.11 
 (0.17)  (0.18)  
Arthritis (limits activity) 0.26  0.29 0.28 
 (0.44)  (0.46)  
Myocardial Infarction 0.03  0.03 0.14 
 (0.16)  (0.18)  
Congestive Heart Failure 0.03  0.04 0.14 
 (0.18)  (0.20)  
Angina (limits activity) 0.03  0.04 0.13 
 (0.18)  (0.20)  
Psychiatric (in treatment) 0.04  0.04 0.11 
 (0.19)  (0.19)  
Observations: 30650  19495  
a This variable records the number of active health conditions the respondent has; the 
conditions are: hypertension (not under control), diabetes (not under control), cancer (in 
treatment), lung disease (limits activity), stroke (problems persist), arthritis (limits 
activity), myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, angina (limits activity), and 
psychiatric disorder (in treatment). 
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score counts how many of the following tasks the respondent has difficulty performing: 
making phone calls, handling money, and taking medication. 
 To measure mental health I use two measures.  The first is an indicator that 
reports if the respondent has ever been diagnosed with a psychiatric or emotional disorder 
and they are currently receiving treatment for that disorder.  I include this measure in the 
count of “active” health conditions described above.  The second measure is the 
respondent's Center for Epidemiological Studies of Depression (CESD) score, which 
indicates the presence and intensity of depressive disorders.  The CESD score is not, 
however, intended for determining whether the respondent meets clinical definitions of 
depressive disorders.  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for these measures. 
 
Econometric Approach 
The objective of this chapter is to estimate the role that beneficiary health plays in 
the relationship between Medicare Part D and hospital utilizations.  To achieve this 
objective I conduct a set of analyses to quantify the relationships between Part D, 
beneficiary health, and the use of hospital services.  In the psychometric literature this 
approach is known as “mediation analysis.”   Mediation analysis is used to establish that 
the causal relationship between two variables flows through a third, mediating, variable.  
There are four hypotheses involved in establishing mediation, which are depicted in 
Figure 1.20  The first hypothesis tests whether Part D has a causal relationship with 
hospital utilizations.  The second hypothesis tests whether Part D has any direct effect 
(i.e., not through health) on the use of hospital services.  This hypothesis can be used to 
                                                
20 See Baron and Kenny (1986), Judd and Kenny (1981), and James and Brett (1984). 
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determine whether health completely, or only partially, mediates the causal relationship.  
The third hypothesis tests whether health has an effect on the use of hospital services.  
The final hypothesis tests whether Part D has an effect on beneficiary health. 
To test these hypotheses I estimate three distinct econometric models.  The first 
model is used to estimate the effect of Part D on hospital utilizations.  The second model 
is used to simultaneously estimate the direct effects of health and Part D on hospital 
utilizations.   The third model is used to estimate the effect of Part D on beneficiary 
health.  I describe each of these models in turn. 
 
Figure 1 
 
The Four Hypotheses Involved in Establishing Mediation 
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 To quantify the causal impact of Medicare Part D on the use of hospital services, I 
estimate incidence rate ratios (IRRs), which represent the percentage difference in 
hospital utilizations between Part D participants and abstainers.  IRRs are similar to an 
average treatment effect (ATE), which represents the raw scale difference in hospital 
utilizations between Part D participants and abstainers.  IRRs have the distinct advantage 
of omitting multiplicatively separable unobserved effects in the same way that ATEs omit 
additively separable unobserved effects.  This is convenient since hospital utilizations are 
most appropriately modeled non-linearly with multiplicative unobserved effects.  IRRs 
also have the advantage that they measure the effect of Part D in percentage terms so that 
the magnitude of the effect can easily be assessed. 
 The effect of Medicare Part D on the use of hospital services is likely different for 
those beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage compared to those 
beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage.  Accordingly, I estimate a 
separate IRR for these two beneficiary types.  Let  y1
a  denote the number of inpatient 
stays (or hospital nights) that would have occurred if the respondent had enrolled in a 
Part D plan after having had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage.  Similarly, let  y0
a  
denote the number of inpatient stays (or hospital nights) that would have occurred if the 
respondent had not enrolled in Part D after having had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage.  Finally, let  y1
b  and  y0
b  be analogously defined for those respondents who had 
generous pre-Part D drug coverage.  The IRR for those beneficiaries who had limited or 
no pre-Part D drug coverage can be specified as follows: 
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IRRa =
y1
a
y0
a .    (52) 
 
 
If  IRRa >1, then more inpatient stays (or hospital nights) would have occurred with Part 
D than without Part D; if  IRRa <1, then fewer inpatient stays (or hospital nights) would 
have occurred with Part D than without Part D; and if  IRRa = 1 , then the same number of 
inpatient stays (or hospital nights) would have occurred with Part D as without Part D.  
The following transformation of the IRR defined in (52) allows the effect of Part D to be 
interpreted as a percentage difference in inpatient stays (or hospital nights) that would 
have occurred with and without Part D: 
 
 
IRR! a =
y1
a
y0
a −1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
⋅100.    (53) 
 
 
I present the transformed IRR defined in (53) since it is relatively easier to interpret.  To 
quantify the impact of Part D for those beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug 
coverage I estimate the following analog of (53): 
 
 
IRR! b =
y1
b
y0
b −1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
⋅100.   (54) 
 
 
As described in Terza (2014b) the counterfactuals in (53) and (54) can be 
replaced with regression predictions when the set of confounders employed is 
comprehensive.  Intuitively, if one can assume that the regression model does not omit 
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any factors that are simultaneously related to Part D and hospital utilizations, then one 
can assume that treatment is conditionally exogenous.  Let  d1it  denote a binary variable 
that indicates if respondent i was enrolled in a Medicare Part D plan at period t, let  d2it  
denote a binary variable that indicates if respondent i had limited or no drug coverage in 
all periods prior to period t, and let  d3it  denote the interaction  d1it × d2it .  The vector 
 
dit ≡ d1it d2it d3it⎡⎣ ⎤⎦  encompasses the four distinct “treatment” states implicit in (53) 
and (54).21  With a comprehensive vector of confounders, denoted by  vit , the following 
equality holds:22 
 
 
y1
a = E yit | dit , vit⎡⎣ ⎤⎦.    (55) 
 
 
That is, with comprehensive confounding the counterfactual outcome,  y1
a , can be 
replaced with the mean of  yit  conditional on the treatment state associated with  y1
a .  
Analogous equalities hold for  y0
a ,  y1
b , and  y0
b .  Equation (55) is useful because the right-
hand side can often be specified, and consistently estimated, via standard regression-
based methods.  I assume that for all t= 1, 2, ..., T 
 
 
E yit | dit , vit = ui λ t xit⎡⎣ ⎤⎦⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = ui ⋅exp(λ t + ditαd + xitαx ) ,  (56) 
                                                
21 Specifically, beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage and enrolled or did 
not enroll in a Medicare Part D plan, and beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage and 
enrolled or did not enroll in a Medicare Part D plan. 
22 Equation (55) is not definitional; rather, equation (55) reflects the notion that regression 
predictions can replace the potential outcome on the left-hand side when the set of confounders is 
comprehensive.  See Terza (2014b) for a more complete derivation of this result. 
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where  ui  denotes an unobserved individual-specific effect,  λ t  denotes a period-specific 
fixed effect, and  xit  denotes a vector of time-varying regression controls.  The vector  xit  
includes age, household income, marital status, a set of variables that indicate the 
presence of other health insurance contracts, a set of variables that indicate the region of 
the country, and a set of variables that measure baseline health. 
 Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) developed a fixed effects Poisson (FEP) 
estimator and a random effects Poisson (REP) estimator for model (56).  The fixed effect 
assumption is potentially less restrictive since it allows for  ui  to be correlated with  dit   
and/or  xit .  In this case  ui  accounts for any potentially omitted factors that are time-
invariant, thereby strengthening the argument of comprehensive confounding.  
Accordingly, the fixed effects assumption lends additional credibility to the argument that 
the Part D estimates are causally interpretable.  However, a fixed effect identification 
strategy is not robust to the presence of unobserved confounders that are time varying or 
cannot be conceptualized as a baseline initial condition.  Another limitation of the FEP 
model is that it can only be estimated on the subsample of observations such that 
 yit ≠ 0t∑ , however.  This restriction on the estimation sample could induce a selectivity 
bias that would otherwise not be present.  Furthermore, the choice between the fixed 
effects version of model (56) and a random effects version is empirically testable.  
Therefore, I estimate model (56) using the FEP estimator and two random effects Poisson 
(REP) estimators.  The first REP estimator is applied to the fixed effects sample to test 
whether the random effects assumption is appropriate.  The second REP estimator is 
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applied to the unrestricted sample to test whether restricting the sample induces selection 
bias.  In the event that the random effects assumption is rejected, this second test is no 
longer valid, but remains potentially informative.  Testing is based on generalized 
Hausman tests of the equality of the coefficients across each specification.  Additional 
detail regarding these testing procedures and the variance-covariance matrices required to 
calculate the test statistics is provided in Appendix C. 
 Using (55) and (56) equation (53) can be estimated as follows: 
 
 
IRR! a =
ui ⋅exp(λ t +αd1 +αd2 +αd3 + xitαx )
ui ⋅exp(λ t +αd2 + xitαx )
−1
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
⋅100 .  (57) 
 
 
which simplifies to 
 
 IRR
!
a = exp(αd1 +αd3)−1{ } ⋅100 .   (58) 
 
 
Likewise, after simplification, the following is a consistent estimator for (58): 
 
 IRR
!
b = exp(αd1)−1{ } ⋅100    (59) 
 
 
The asymptotic variances for the IRR estimators in (58) and (59) can be obtained via the 
general method developed in Terza (2014c).  The generic approach laid out therein is 
equivalent to the delta method approximation in this case, however.  I use “nlcom,” a 
post-estimation command available in Stata 11, to calculate (58) and (59), and I conduct 
inference based on delta method standard errors. 
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 Hypotheses two and three can be tested in the context of a single econometric 
model that simultaneously controls for Part D and improvements in health.  Then one can 
estimate the effect that health has on the use of hospital services in such a way that health 
is not serving as a proxy for Part D.  One can furthermore estimate the direct effect that 
Part D has on hospital utilizations.  That is, the effect of Part D net of any effect that 
operates through changes in health.  The model that I employ assumes, as in hypothesis 
one, that for all t = 1, 2, .., T 
 
 
E yit | dit , ui , λ t , xit , zit⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = ui ⋅exp(λ t + ditβd + xitβx + zitβz ) ,  (60) 
 
 
where  zit  denotes a vector of health factors for respondent i measured at the end of 
period t (or at follow-up).  End-of-period health characteristics represent a set of health 
outcomes, which could be influenced by Part D and which could explain the number of 
inpatient stays or hospital nights that occur during period t.23  The vector  zit  includes 
ADL, IADL, CESD, and a count of the number of active health conditions.  See Table 3 
for a list of the active health conditions included in this count.  Since beginning-of-period 
health characteristics cannot be influenced by Part D these can be included as controls in 
model (56). 
 The direct effect of Part D can be quantified by estimating the same IRRs as 
defined in (58) and (59).  If these effect measures are zero, then health completely 
mediates the relationship between Part D and the use of hospital services.  If these effects 
                                                
23 The variables included in zit derive from a retrospective questionnaire.  Thus the end-of-period 
health characteristics quantify the health of respondents over the previous two-year period. 
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are non-zero, then health only partially mediates.  Finally, the indirect effect of Part D 
(i.e., the effect of Part D that operates through its effect on health) can be recovered as the 
difference between the total and direct effects of Part D.  To test whether the indirect 
effects are statistically different from zero I use generalized Hausman tests (see Appendix 
C). 
 The effect of health is not easily quantifiable from model (60) since health enters 
multi-dimensionally.  Hypothesis three can be tested, however, by testing whether the set 
of end-of-period health measures are jointly significant.  If the set of end-of-period health 
characteristics are jointly significant, then it can be concluded that health has an effect on 
the use of hospital services. 
 Hypothesis four involves estimating the relationship between Part D and 
beneficiary health.  Since the primary variable that I use to control for health outcomes in 
hypotheses two and three is a count of the number of active health conditions, I use this 
variable as the outcome in a third panel Poisson analysis.  Specifically, I assume that for 
all t= 1, 2, .., T 
 
 
E hit | dit , ui , λ t , xit⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = ui ⋅exp(λ t + ditγ d + xitγ x ) ,  (61) 
 
 
where  hit  denotes the count of active health conditions.  To quantify the effect of Part D 
on health I again calculate IRRs.  As before, model (61) allows the effects of Part D to 
differ across beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage and 
beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage.  I conduct the same testing 
procedures across FEP and two REP specifications as with previous hypotheses. 
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Results 
 In 2006, 57% of the sample had Part D drug coverage.  An additional 7 
percentage of the sample gained Part D coverage in 2008.  These enrollment rates are 
higher than those reported by Levy and Weir (2009), who reported a 24% enrollment rate 
in stand-alone Part D plans.  This discrepancy is due to the fact that I have a different 
sample and because I include those beneficiaries with Medicaid or Medicare Advantage 
drug coverage in my Part D measure.  After 2006, “dual eligibles” (i.e., Medicare and 
Medicaid enrollees) were automatically enrolled in Part D plans.  Also, if beneficiaries 
are Medicare Advantage plan holders they cannot get their drug benefits through a stand-
alone Part D plan, but can get comparable drug benefits through a Medicare Advantage 
prescription drug plan.  In 2006, 60% of the sample had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage.  This is more than double the uninsured rate reported by Safran et al. (2005), 
but the majority of this group is composed of respondents that had limited pre-Part D 
drug coverage versus no coverage.  In 2006, 65% of those respondents that enrolled in a 
Part D plan had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage. 
 Table 2 (above) reports descriptive statistics for the number of inpatient stays, the 
number of hospital nights, and the demographic characteristics of the analysis sample.  
The first column presents means and standard deviations for the full sample.  The second 
column presents means and standard deviations for the sample used in the FEP analyses.  
The third column presents the within standard deviations for this latter sample.  Since the 
FEP specifications exclude respondents who never had any inpatient stays or nights, the 
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mean number of inpatient stays and hospital nights are larger in the FE sample.  All of the 
other demographic characteristics are remarkably similar across the two samples. 
 Table 3 (above) reports descriptive statistics for the health measures.  The table 
organization mirrors that of Table 2.  The mean ADL and IADL scores are very similar 
across the full and FE samples.  The mean CESD score and the mean number of active 
conditions are larger in the FE sample.  This is not surprising since it is expected that 
health affects the use of hospital services.  Thus, after omitting respondents who never 
were hospitalized, it is expected that the remaining respondents are the least healthy 
among the full sample.  Also, it appears that differences in the proportion of respondents 
with active arthritis diagnoses explains a large portion of the difference in the mean 
number of active conditions.  Nagamine, Jiang, and Merrill (2006) reported that 
osteoarthritis is included in the top ten conditions that explain 40% of the annual number 
of hospitalizations among the elderly.  Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, stroke, 
myocardial infarction, and congestive heart failure are also on that list.  There are also 
slightly more respondents in the FE sample with lung disease, and congestive heart 
failure. 
 Table 4 presents the inpatient stay results associated with testing hypotheses one, 
two, and three.  The table reports raw coefficients, which indicate the direction of the 
effect but not the magnitude.  To assess the magnitude of the effect I calculate 
transformed IRRs (i.e.,  IRR −1{ } ⋅100 ).  These transformed IRRs are interpreted as the
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Table 4 
 
The Effects of Part D on Inpatient Stays 
 
 Total Effects of Part Da  Direct Effectsb 
 FEP REPc REPd  FEP 
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage -0.14** -0.06 -0.05  -0.14 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.09) 
 [-13.02] [-5.53] [-4.96]  [-12.76] 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage 0.03 0.01 0.05  0.04 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) 
 [2.53] [1.03] [5.22]  [3.93] 
ADL (Follow-Up)     0.05* 
     (0.03) 
IADL (Follow-Up)     0.14** 
     (0.06) 
CESD (Follow-Up)     0.02* 
     (0.01) 
Active Conditions (Follow-Up)     0.23*** 
     (0.03) 
Observations: 19495 19495 30650  11689 
FEP v. REP:e  221.59 373.10   
p value:  {0.00} {0.00}   
REP v. REP:f   324.11   
p value:   {0.00}   
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage:g     0.00 
p value:     {0.97} 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage:h     0.04 
p value:     {0.84} 
Health (Follow-Up):i     97.61 
p value:     {0.00} 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Transformed incidence rate ratios (i.e., {IRR-1} × 100) in square brackets; the transformed IRRs 
represent the percentage impact of the covariate 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a The total effects of Part D measure the effects of Part D that operate through changes in beneficiary 
health plus any direct effects. 
b The direct effects of Part D measure the effects of Part D that do not operate through changes in 
beneficiary health. 
c Column reports results from a random effects Poisson estimator applied to the fixed effects sample. 
d Column reports results from a random effects Poisson estimator applied to the full sample. 
e Tests the equality of the common coefficients across the FEP and REP models. 
f Tests the equality of the coefficients across the two REP models. 
g Tests the equality of the Part D effect among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage. 
h Tests the equality of the Part D effect among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug 
coverage. 
i Tests the joint significance of ADL (Follow-Up), IADL (Follow-Up), CESD (Follow-Up), and 
Active Conditions (Follow-Up). 
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percentage impact of Part D on the number of inpatient stays.  For the Part D effects, the 
table also reports these transformed IRRs in square brackets.  Table C1 presents all model 
coefficients and can be found in Appendix C.  The FEP results indicate that Part D 
reduced the number of inpatient stays by 13.02% [95% CI: -23.59%, -2.44%] among 
beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage.  Among beneficiaries who 
had generous pre-Part D drug coverage, the FEP results indicate a small, positive, and 
statistically insignificant effect of 2.53% [95% CI: -11.81%, 16.87%].  The second and 
third columns of Table 4 present results from REP specifications applied to the FEP and 
full samples, respectively.  The results from the REP specification applied to the FEP 
sample indicate that Part D reduced the number of inpatient says by 5.53% [95% CI: -
14.29%, 3.22%] among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage, 
and that Part D increased the number of inpatient stays by a statistically insignificant 
1.03% [95% CI: -9.57%, 11.63%].  The results from the REP specification applied to the 
full sample indicates that Part D reduced the number of inpatients stays by 4.96% [95% 
CI: -14.29%, 4.37%] among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage, and that Part D increased the number of inpatient stays by 5.22% [95% CI: -
6.57%, 17.19%] among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage.  Thus 
it appears that Part D reduced the number of inpatient stays among beneficiaries who had 
limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage, but had little to no impact among beneficiaries 
who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage. 
 To assess the validity of the RE assumption, and to assess the extent to which the 
FE sample drives the results associated with the FE specification, I conduct generalized 
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Hausman tests of the equality of the coefficients across each of the specifications 
reported in columns one through three of Table 4.  The results are summarized at the 
bottom of the table.  Comparing the FE specification with the RE specification applied to 
the FE sample, the evidence indicates that the RE assumption is likely violated ( χ
2  = 
221.59, p = 0.00).  Comparing the two RE specifications, the evidence indicates that the 
coefficients in each of the RE specifications are statistically significantly different from 
each other ( χ
2 = 324.11, p = 0.00).  This latter result lends informal evidence that the FE 
results are partially a reflection of the estimation sample used.  It is plausible, however, 
that the FE specification represents a consistent approach to estimating the effect of Part 
D among patients that reported at least one hospitalization.  For this reason, and since the 
generalized Hausman test indicates that the RE assumption is inappropriate, the FE 
results are preferred.  
 The final column in Table 4 presents FE results associated with testing hypotheses 
two and three.  I only present a FE specification since the FE specification was preferred 
above.  Hypothesis two involves testing whether Part D has a direct effect on the number 
of inpatient stays.  The results indicate that Part D has a direct effect of -12.76% [95% 
CI: -27.31%, 1.78%] among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage and a direct effect of 3.93% [95% CI: -15.19%, 23.06%] among beneficiaries 
who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage.  This implies a very small indirect effect 
among both beneficiary types, where the indirect effect is given by the total effect 
reported in the first column minus the direct effect reported in the fourth column.  This 
also suggests that health does not explain much of the effect.  
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 Hypothesis three involves testing whether health outcomes have a direct effect on 
the number of inpatient stays.  Health outcomes are measured with a set of follow-up 
health characteristics, which were recorded at the end of each period.  These factors are 
jointly significant ( χ
2  = 97.61, p = 0.00).  Additionally, each follow-up health factor has 
a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of inpatient stays individually.  
The largest effect is associated with the number of active health conditions at follow-up.  
For each additional active health condition, the number of inpatient stays increases by 
26.36% [95% CI: 19.49%, 33.23%].  This would translate into a very large effect at high 
levels of active health conditions.  It is worth noting, however, that the average number of 
active health conditions is low (0.63) and that only one respondent ever had a maximum 
of 8 out of the 10 conditions. 
 Table 5 presents the hospital night results associated with testing hypotheses one 
through three.  The results again only indicate the direction of the effect.  To assess the 
magnitude of the effect I calculate transformed IRRs (i.e.,  IRR −1{ } ⋅100 ), which are 
interpreted as the percentage impact of enrolling in a Part D insurance plan on the 
number of hospital nights.  All model coefficients are reported in Table C2 in Appendix 
C.  The FEP results indicate that Part D reduced the number of hospital nights by 16.52% 
[95% CI: -34.06%, 1.01%] among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage.  Among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage, the FEP 
results indicate that Part D reduced the number of hospital nights by 21.91% [95% CI: -
41.28%, -2.53%].  As before, the second and third columns present results from REP 
specifications applied to the FE and full samples, respectively.  The results from the REP
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Table 5 
 
The Effects of Part D on Hospital Nights 
 
 Total Effects of Part Da  Direct Effectsb 
 FEP REPc REPd  FEP 
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage -0.18* -0.16 -0.17  -0.14 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.16) 
 [-16.52] [-14.58] [-15.31]  [-12.87] 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage -0.25* -0.20* -0.21*  -0.15 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.16) 
 [-21.91] [-18.53] [-18.84]  [-13.55] 
ADL (Follow-Up)     0.14*** 
     (0.05) 
IADL (Follow-Up)     -0.14 
     (0.14) 
CESD (Follow-Up)     0.06*** 
     (0.02) 
Active Conditions (Follow-Up)     0.23*** 
     (0.05) 
Observations: 19495 19495 30650  11679 
FEP v. REP:e  218.42 208.83   
p value:  {0.00} {0.00}   
REP v. REP:f   103.43   
p value:   {0.00}   
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage:g     0.11 
p value:     {0.73} 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage:h     0.67 
p value:     {0.41} 
Health (Follow-Up):i     50.46 
p value:     {0.00} 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Transformed incidence rate ratios (i.e., {IRR-1} × 100) in square brackets; the transformed IRRs 
represent the percentage impact of the covariate 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a The total effects of Part D measure the effects of Part D that operate through changes in beneficiary 
health plus any direct effects. 
b The direct effects of Part D measure the effects of Part D that do not operate through changes in 
beneficiary health. 
c Column reports results from a random effects Poisson estimator applied to the fixed effects sample. 
d Column reports results from a random effects Poisson estimator applied to the full sample. 
e Tests the equality of the common coefficients across the FEP and REP models. 
f Tests the equality of the coefficients across the two REP models. 
g Tests the equality of the Part D effect among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage. 
h Tests the equality of the Part D effect among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug 
coverage. 
i Tests the joint significance of ADL (Follow-Up), IADL (Follow-Up), CESD (Follow-Up), and 
Active Conditions (Follow-Up). 
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specification applied to the FEP sample indicates that Part D reduced the number of 
hospital nights by 14.58% [95% CI: -31.81%, 2.64%] among beneficiaries who had 
limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage and reduced the number of hospital nights by 
18.53% [95% CI: -37.74%, 0.68%] among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D 
drug coverage.  The results from the REP specification applied to the full sample are 
remarkably similar to both the FEP results and the results from the REP specification 
applied to the FEP sample.  Accordingly, the evidence consistently indicates that Part D 
has had a large and negative effect on the number of hospital nights.  
 I conduct the same generalized Hausman tests as described above.  The evidence 
is summarized at the bottom of Table 5 and indicates that the RE assumption may be 
violated, and that the FE results may be partially driven by the FE estimation sample.  
Therefore, by the same argument as before, the FE results are preferred.  This preference 
is further supported by statistical testing of the equality of the Part D effects associated 
with each specification.  In particular, test results (not reported) indicate that the 
estimated IRRs from the RE specifications are not statistically different from each other, 
while the IRRs from the FE specification is statistically different from the RE 
specifications.  
 The final column of Table 5 presents the hospital night results associated with 
testing hypotheses two and three.  Hypothesis two involves testing whether Part D has a 
direct effect on the number of hospital nights.  The results indicate that, after controlling 
for health outcomes, Part D reduced the number of hospital nights by 12.87% [95% CI: -
39.54%, 13.81%] among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage 
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and decreased the number of hospital nights by 13.55% [95% CI: -40.68%, 13.57%] 
among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage.  As before, this implies 
a small (but larger) negative indirect effect (i.e., the total effect reported in the first 
column minus the direct effect reported in the fourth column).  The change in coefficients 
from the first column to the fourth column is larger among beneficiaries who had 
generous pre-Part D drug coverage.  The indirect effect implied by the difference in 
effects is not statistically significant at any conventional level, however.  
 Hypothesis three involves testing whether health outcomes have a direct effect on 
the number of hospital nights.  Health outcomes are measured by a set of health factors 
recorded at end of each period.  These factors are jointly significant ( χ
2  = 50.46, p = 
0.00).  Again the number of active conditions at follow-up has a large, positive, and 
statistically significant effect on the number of hospital nights.  In terms of transformed 
IRRs, the results indicate that each additional active health condition increases the 
number of hospital nights by 26.12% [95% CI: 14.14%, 38.10%].  ADL and CESD also 
have large effects.  The effect of IADL is negative and approximately counterbalances 
the effect of ADL on the number of hospital nights.  This may reflect a high level of 
correlation between ADL and IADL, which prevents uniquely identifying the separate 
effects of each functional limitation measure. 
 Table 6 presents the results associated with testing hypothesis four.  Table C3 
included in Appendix C presents all model coefficients.  Hypothesis four involves testing 
whether Part D has any effect on health.  Since the primary health outcome used in 
testing hypotheses two and three is a variable that counts the number of active health 
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conditions, I analyze this outcome with a third set of panel Poisson specifications.  After 
calculating transformed IRRs (i.e.,  IRR −1{ } ⋅100 ), the FEP results indicate that Part D 
reduced the number of active health conditions by 8.46% [95% CI: -17.74%, 0.82%] 
among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage.  Among 
beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage, the FEP results indicate that 
Part D reduced the number of active health conditions by 9.00% [95% CI: -17.42%, -
0.57%].  The second and third columns present REP specifications applied to the FEP 
and full samples, respectively.  Both REP specifications indicate a statistically 
insignificant and small negative effect among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre- 
 
Part D drug coverage.  Among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage, 
the REP specification applied to the FEP sample estimates a small, positive, and 
statistically insignificant effect.  The REP specification applied to the full sample 
indicates that Part D increased the number of active health conditions by 10.84% [95% 
CI: 1.38%, 20.29%] among these beneficiaries.   
 As with the hospital utilization models I test the differences between the FEP and 
REP specifications.  The generalized Hausman testing results indicate that the REP 
assumption may be violated ( χ
2  = 497.01, p= 0.00).  The REP specifications are also 
statistically different from each other.  Since the REP assumption may be violated, and 
because the FEP results likely reflect consistent results for the sample of beneficiaries 
analyzed in hypotheses one through three, the FEP results are preferred. 
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Table 6 
 
The Effect of Part D on Active Health Conditionsa 
 
 FEP REPb REPc 
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage -0.09* -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 [-8.46] [-4.36] [-0.71] 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage -0.09** 0.02 0.10** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 [-9.00] [1.63] [10.84] 
Observations: 11609 11609 20961 
FEP v. REP:d  497.01 611.33 
p value:  {0.00} {0.00} 
REP v. REP:e   147.46 
p value:   {0.00} 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Transformed incidence rate ratios (i.e., {IRR-1} × 100) in square brackets; the transformed IRRs 
represent the percentage impact of the covariate 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Active health conditions include: hypertension (not under control), diabetes (not under control), 
cancer (in treatment), lung disease (limits activity), stroke (problems persist), arthritis (limits 
activity), myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, angina (limits activity), and psychiatric 
disorder (in treatment). 
b Column reports results from a random effects Poisson applied to the fixed effects sample. 
c Column reports results from a random effects Poisson applied to the full sample. 
d Tests the equality of the coefficients in the FEP and REP models. 
e Tests the equality of the coefficients in the two REP models. 
 
 
 One important limitation of this chapter is that the identification strategy is a fixed 
effects strategy.  This means that the econometric approach is not robust to the potential 
that there exist some unobserved factors that vary across time and explain the 
beneficiary's decision to enroll in Part D plans as well as variation in their hospital 
utilization outcomes.  For instance, risk preferences are not controlled for in any of the 
models presented above.  If risk preferences cannot be modeled as a stationary 
unobserved factor, then fixed effects will fail to control for the possibility that 
unobserved risk preferences may influence the Part D enrollment decision and the 
number of hospitalizations.  In this scenario an instrumental variables approach could 
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provide a better estimation strategy.  Early in the research process I tested a number of 
possible instruments, but failed to find anything that passed weak instrument tests.  One 
difficulty I encountered that hampered my ability to find strong instruments is that the 
public use files do not contain state identifiers.  There are a number of possible 
instruments that could be constructed on the basis of variation in the implementation of 
Medicare Part D across states, as well as variation across states that derives from 
interactions between Medicare Part D and state-specific implementations of the Medicaid 
system.  In the future I hope to gain access to restricted data files that will allow me to 
pursue identification strategies based on such instruments.  Despite this limitation, this 
chapter provides a reasonable “first-pass” approach that models unobserved factors such 
as risk preferences as baseline conditions that do not change over time.  
 All of the models discussed above control for age and period fixed effects.  It 
appears that these measures are highly collinear, and that the degree of collinearity makes 
it difficult to consistently and separately identify the effects of age and period.  This is 
most apparent in the first column of Table 4, where the period effects indicate that 
hospital nights decrease over time.  This is a counterintuitive result that disappears after 
dropping the age variable.  Furthermore, the effect of age on hospital nights is larger than 
expected.  In terms of a transformed IRR, the FEP model estimates that each additional 
year of age increases the number of hospital nights by 26%.  This implies that hospital 
nights double every 3.8 years, which seems unlikely.  None of the results reported above 
are substantively different if age is dropped from the analysis.  It may be the case that age 
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is an unnecessary control in the FEP models since the unobserved individual fixed effect 
may control for the effect of time-invariant baseline age effects.   
 The period effects also appear to be inflated even after dropping age, however.  
Further investigation revealed that the FEP models estimate larger period effects when 
comparing more distant periods.  With the base period set to 2004-2006, and after 
dropping age, the last two period effects are both less than or equal to the average within-
person change in inpatient stays or nights.  The estimated difference in inpatient stays or 
nights between the 1996-1998 period and the 2004-2006 period are slightly larger than 
the average within-person change, however, suggesting that these period effects are 
slightly inflated.  This may reflect the fact that the panel is unbalanced and fewer 
respondents are available to make comparisons across more distant periods.  Restricting 
the analysis to the last three waves of data produces slightly larger (in absolute value) 
Part D effects with similar post-Part D period effects as the model applied on the full 
panel. 
 In the FEP hospital night model, the region fixed effects also appear to be 
inflated.  The FEP model estimates that respondents in the Midwest have 63% fewer 
hospital nights than respondents in the West.  Though it is plausible that there is 
variability in hospital utilizations across regions of the country, this degree of variability 
seems unlikely.  This inflation is likely due to the fact that there is almost no within 
variation in the region indicators.  All of the results reported above remain after dropping 
the region variables.  Furthermore, the Part D and prior drug coverage indicators have 
much higher within variation and so likely would not be inflated for this reason.  In fact, 
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the within variation can be arbitrarily increased for the Part D indicator by omitting all 
but one of the pre-Part D waves and re-estimating the models with only data from 2004-
2010.  Since the results are slightly larger (in absolute value) rather than smaller, this 
suggests that the within variability is large enough to get consistent estimates from the 
FEP estimator.  
 In spite of these potential concerns the effects of Part D estimated in this chapter 
appear to be reliable.  In particular, none of the robustness checks described above 
affected the main results.  Furthermore, the effect of Part D on the number of inpatient 
stays is very similar to results reported in Hsu et al. (2006) and in Kaestner et al. (2014).  
Hsu et al. (2006) report an effect of 13%, which is identical to my estimated effect of 
13% among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage.  My estimated 
effect is larger than the 8% effect estimated by Kaestner et al. (2014), but they do not 
differentiate between beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug coverage and 
beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug coverage. 
 
Discussion 
 On the extensive margin (i.e., inpatient stays) the evidence indicates that Part D 
had a large negative effect among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage and that improvements in health do not explain any of this relationship.  These 
results could be explained by the fact that Medicare Part A covers inpatient prescription 
drug use.  To see this, let “ex ante drug use” refer to medication use before an adverse 
health event occurs, and which may prevent its occurrence.  Similarly, let “ex post drug 
use” refer to medication use after an adverse health outcome has occurred, and which 
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may have been avoided with ex ante drug use.  It is possible that beneficiaries who had 
limited drug coverage prior to the implementation of Part D substituted toward relatively 
less costly ex post drug use, but after the implementation of Part D substituted toward 
relatively less costly ex ante drug use.  Assuming that both types of drug use are 
productive in terms of improving patient health, then the health produced by ex ante drug 
use may only be slightly better than the health produced by ex post drug use.  Thus we 
might observe a negative relationship between Part D and the use of hospital services that 
is not explained by the improvement in beneficiary health.  This remains an empirical 
question, however.  More research should be conducted to investigate this, and other 
hypothesized, mechanisms.  Among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug 
coverage the evidence indicates that Part D had almost no effect on the number of 
hospital stays. 
 Among both beneficiary types the evidence indicates that Part D had a stronger 
impact on the intensive margin (i.e., hospital nights) than on the extensive margin.  This 
suggests that Part D is more effective at reducing the intensity with which illnesses need 
to be treated than at reducing the occurrence of illness.  The Part D effects slightly 
change after controlling for health outcomes, but are statistically imprecise.  Thus there is 
no statistical evidence that health explains the relationship between Part D and the use of 
hospital nights.  The relatively small indirect effects are in line with the modest effect that 
Part D had on the number of active health conditions. 
 This chapter investigated the effect of Part D on the use of inpatient hospital 
services.  More research should be conducted to identify the relationship between Part D 
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and other health care services, and the extent to which changes in beneficiary health 
explain these relationships.  For instance, it is possible that Part D has a different 
relationship with the use of outpatient and/or emergency department services.  
Furthermore, since physicians act as gatekeepers for the use of pharmaceuticals, Part D 
could have a positive effect on the use of physician services.  On the other hand, the 
effect of Part D on health could imply a negative relationship between Part D and the use 
of physician services.  A formal mediation analysis could investigate whether there is a 
negative indirect effect that operates through the effect of Part D on health, and whether 
there is a positive direct effect that operates through the use of physician's gatekeeper 
services. 
 The evidence supports the conclusion that cost-offsets are likely and fairly large.  
Pfuntner, Weir, and Steiner (2013) estimated that the average cost per hospital stay for an 
individual between the ages of 65 and 84 to be about $12,300.  Using this figure the 
estimated effect of Part D on the number of hospital stays implies a reduction in hospital 
stay expenditures of about $1,600 for every $12,300 that would have otherwise been 
spent in the absence of Part D.  The Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) reports that the 
average cost of a hospital night could be as much as $1,600 in 2006 (see 
http://kff.org/other/state-ind1icator/expenses-per-inpatient-day-by-ownership/).  Using 
this figure the estimated impacts of Part D on the number of hospital nights implies a 
reduction in hospital night expenditures between $240 and $320 for every $1,600 that 
would have otherwise been spent. 
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 Cost-offset estimates may be useful in assessing the costs and benefits of 
Medicare Part D, as well as conducting more broadly defined economic evaluations.  The 
evidence produced in this chapter suggests that a majority of the cost-offset effect is 
unrelated to health, however.  Accordingly, cost-offset estimates may be useful in 
tabulating the costs of the Medicare Part D program, but should not be used in tabulating 
the monetary benefits associated with the program without further investigations into the 
role that health plays and proper accounting of the proportion of the cost-offset effect that 
can be attributed to improvements in health.  This chapter does indicate a high degree of 
substitutability between the use of prescription medications and hospital services.  Future 
research should attempt to determine whether these substitution effects can be leveraged 
to increase the cost-effectiveness of the Part D program.
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 This dissertation has explored three important issues related to econometrics and 
economics of health care.  The second and third chapters explored issues that relate to 
appropriate methodology required for estimating health care expenditure/utilization 
models.  The fourth chapter explored the effect of Medicare Part D on the use of hospital 
services.  The knowledge gained in this dissertation research is both scientifically 
rigorous and currently relevant.  The methodology contributions have many future 
possible applications.  The applied contribution in chapter IV provides a strong 
foundation for a number of additional research topics. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER II 
 
 
Derivation of Equation (12) from (14) 
Let 
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which is equivalent to (12).  Equation (18) is easily obtained using the above calculation 
except that 1D−  does not appear from the outset, and one must allow the extent of 
participation vector of observable confounders differ from the first-hurdle resulting in 
o2X  being used rather than o1X  in the exponentiated linear index. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER III 
 
 
Derivation of Equation (38) 
Observe: 
 
 (B.1) 
 
 
Under all modeling assumptions one can write24 
 
 . (B.2) 
 
 
Using (B.2), we can obtain the marginal density of H as follows: 
                                                
24 This follows from the normality assumptions, the fact that conditional on W these random 
variables are independent, and because Xu can be composed in terms of the truncated densities implicit in 
(B.2). 
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.  (B.3) 
 
 
Combining (B.1), (B.2), and (B.3), and after omitting components involving H=0, the 
following obtains: 
 
.   (B.4) 
 
 
On the basis of (B.4) we can write: 
 
,  (B.5) 
 
 
which is equivalent to equation (38). 
 
 
 
f (H | Xp,W) = −∞
∞∫ f (Xu ,H | Xp,W)dXu
= XpH
−Wα
∞∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
Φ(Wα)
+ Xp(1− H)
−Wα
∞∫ 1−Φ(Xβ1)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ϕ(Xu )dXu
Φ(Wα)
+ (1− Xp )H
−∞
−Wα∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
1−Φ(Wα)
+ (1− Xp )(1− H)
−∞
−Wα∫ 1−Φ(Xβ1)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ϕ(Xu )dXu
1−Φ(Wα)
 
f (Xu | Xp,W,H = 1) = Xp
Φ(Xβ1)ϕ[Xu>−Wα](Xu )
−Wα
∞∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
+ (1− Xp )
Φ(Xβ1)ϕ[Xu≤−Wα](Xu )
−∞
−Wα∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
 
EXu Y | Xp,W,H = 1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = −∞
∞∫ exp(Xβ2 )f (Xu | Xp,W,H = 1)dXu
= Xp
−Wα
∞∫ exp(Xβ2 )Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
−Wα
∞∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
+ (1− Xp )
−∞
−Wα∫ exp(Xβ2 )Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
−∞
−Wα∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
 101 
Gauss-Legendre Quadrature Routine 
 Note that the range of integration in (38) depends on the value of .  In 
particular, the range of integration is  when  and the range is 
 when .  The following change of variables is immensely useful for 
conducting Gauss-Legendre quadrature with the integration problem inherent in (38): 
 
. (B.6) 
 
 
Using this, the integration problem in (38) can be re-written as: 
 
,  (B.7) 
 
 
where 
 
.   (B.8) 
 
 
Equation (B.7) is in the format needed for Gauss-Legendre quadrature.  Therefore, all 
that one needs to do is obtain the appropriate nodes and weights and then calculate the 
weighted sum required under the Gauss-Legendre rule. 
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Mathematical Details Needed to Construct a Newton-Raphson Algorithm 
 The second-stage estimator described in (39) can be written as 
,   (B.9) 
 
where 
,   (B.10) 
 
,   (B.11) 
 
 
and 
.  (B.12) 
 
 
We need a gradient and a Hessian (or Hessian approximation).  The gradient is 
   (B.13) 
 
 
where .  The first component of (B.13) is 
,   (B.14) 
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where 
,   (B.15) 
 
,   (B.16) 
 
 
and 
.   (B.17) 
 
 
The second component of (B.13) is 
,   (B.18) 
 
 
where 
.  (B.19) 
 
 
We found it more efficient to use the sample analog of the expected value of the Hessian 
matrix in our optimization algorithm.  This matrix is given by 
 
 ei = Yi − Ji(β2 )
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,  (B.20) 
 
 
where 
,  (B.21) 
 
,  (B.22) 
 
 
and 
   (B.23) 
 
 
Asymptotic Details for the Two-Stage Estimator 
 This derivation follows the approach detailed in Terza (2014c).  Let D denote the 
variance covariance matrix for the full two-stage estimator.  Consider the following 
decomposition of D: 
 
,   (B.24) 
 
 
where  denotes the variance matrix for the first-stage estimator for , 
 is the covariance matrix between the first and second-stage estimators, and  is 
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i=1
n
∑∇βpo2Ji(β2 )∇βu 2Ji(β2 )
 
Ê ∇βu 2βu 2Qn
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ = −2i=1
n
∑∇βu 2Ji(β2 )
2
 
D =
D11 D12
D12
′ D22
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
 D11  
δ′ = α′ β1
′⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
 D12  D22
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the variance matrix for the second-stage estimator for .   is readily available since 
it is the standard variance matrix, which can be obtained as post-estimation output in 
Stata. Terza (2014c) has shown that when the second stage is nonlinear least squares, 
then we can write 
 
,  (B.25) 
 
 
and 
,   
 
  (B.26) 
 
 
where AVAR(A) denotes the asymptotic variance of A, AVAR* denotes the variance 
matrix that would be correct if the second-stage estimator did not take first-stage inputs, 
and 
 
,   (B.27) 
 
 
and J( ) is defined in equation (B.12). 
 We start with the gradient of q with respect to the second-stage estimator; the 
gradient is: 
 
,   (B.28) 
 
 β2  D11
 
D12 = −AVAR(δ̂) E ∇β2δq
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
′
E ∇β2β2q
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
−1
 
D22 = E ∇β2β2q
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
−1
E ∇β2δq
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦AVAR(δ̂) E ∇β2δq
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
′
E ∇β2β2q
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
−1
+ AVAR*(β̂2 )
 q = −(Y − J(β2 ))
2
 
∇β2q = ∇βpo2q ∇βu 2q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
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where 
 
,   (B.29) 
 
 
and 
 
.   (B.30) 
 
 
Note that the gradients in (B.29) and (B.30) are given in (B.14) and (B.19).  It is 
relatively easy to obtain the expected value of the second derivative matrix: 
 
 , (B.31) 
 
 
where 
 
,  (B.32) 
 
,  (B.33) 
 
 
and 
 
.   (B.34) 
 
 
 
 
∇βpo2q = 2 e ∇βpo2J(β2 )
 
∇βu 2q = 2 e ∇βu 2J(β2 )
 
E ∇β2β2q
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ =
E ∇βpo2βpo2q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
E ∇βpo2βu 2q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
E ∇βpo2βu 2q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
E ∇βu 2βu 2q
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
E ∇βpo2βpo2q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= 2 e ∇βpo2J(β2 )
′∇βpo2J(β2 )
 
E ∇βpo2βu 2q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= 2 e ∇βpo2J(β2 )∇βu 2J(β2 )
 
E ∇βu 2βu 2q
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ = 2 e ∇βu 2J(β2 )
2
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The expected value of the cross-partial derivative matrix is also relatively easy to obtain: 
,  (B.35) 
 
 
where 
 
,  (B.36) 
 
,  (B.37) 
 
,  (B.38) 
 
,  (B.39) 
 
,  (B.40) 
 
 
and 
 
.  (B.41) 
 
 
Thus all that is needed are analytical expressions for the gradient of J with respect to the 
first-stage estimator.  This gradient is given by: 
 
. (B.42) 
 
 
E ∇β2δq
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ =
E ∇βpo2αq
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
E ∇βpo2βpo1q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
E ∇βpo2βu1q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
E ∇βu 2αq
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ E ∇βu 2βpo1q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
E ∇βu 2βu1q
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
E ∇βpo2αq
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= −2E ∇βpo2J(β2 )
′∇αJ(β2 )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 
E ∇βpo2βpo1q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= −2E ∇βpo2J(β2 )
′∇βpo1J(β2 )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 
E ∇βpo2βu1q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= −2E ∇βpo2J(β2 )∇βu1J(β2 )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 
E ∇βu 2αq
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ = −2E ∇βu 2J(β2 )∇αJ(β2 )
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
 
E ∇βu 2βpo1q
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
= −2E ∇βu 2J(β2 )∇βpo1J(β2 )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
 
E ∇βu 2βu1q
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦ = −2E ∇βu 2J(β2 )∇βu1J(β2 )
⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦
 
∇δJ(β2 ) = ∇αJ(β2 ) ∇βpo1J(β2 ) ∇βu1J(β2 )
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
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It will be helpful to have a couple of results and some new notation before proceeding.  
First, note that25 
 
,   (B.43) 
 
 
and 
 
.   (B.44) 
 
 
Also, let 
 
,  (B.45) 
 
,  (B.46) 
 
,   (B.47) 
 
 
and 
 
.   (B.48) 
 
 
Now we have 
 
,  (B.49) 
 
 
                                                
25 Tierney (1968). 
 ∇α −∞
−Wα∫ g(Xu )dXu = −g(−Wα)W
 ∇α −Wα
∞∫ = g(−Wα)W
 ψ1 = −Wα
∞∫ exp(Xβ2 )Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
 ψ0 = −∞
−Wα∫ exp(Xβ2 )Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
 θ1 = −Wα
∞∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu )
 θ0 = −∞
−Wα∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXu
 
∇αJ(β2 ) = Xp
∇αψ1θ1 − ψ1∇αθ1
θ1
2 + (1− Xp )
∇αψ0θ0 − ψ0∇αθ0
θ0
2
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where 
 
,  (B.50) 
 
,  (B.51) 
 
,  (B.52) 
 
 
and 
 
.  (B.53) 
 
 
Similarly, we have 
 
 
∇βpo1J(β2 ) = Xp
∇βpo1ψ1θ1 − ψ1∇βpo1θ1
θ1
2 + (1− Xp )
∇βpo1ψ0θ0 − ψ0∇βpo1θ0
θ0
2
,  (B.54) 
 
 
where 
 
 
∇βpo1ψ1 = −Wα
∞∫ exp(Xβ2 )Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXuXpo ,  (B.55) 
 
 
∇βpo1θ1 = −Wα
∞∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXuXpo , (D.33)     (B.56) 
 
 
∇βpo1ψ0 = −∞
−Wα∫ exp(Xβ2 )Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXuXpo ,     (B.57) 
 
and 
 
 
∇αψ1 = exp(Xpoβpo2 + (−Wα)βu2 )Φ(Xpoβpo1 + (−Wα))ϕ(−Wα)W
 
∇αθ1 = Φ(Xpoβpo1 + (−Wα))ϕ(−Wα)W
 
∇αψ0 = − exp(Xpoβpo2 + (−Wα))Φ(Xpoβpo1 + (−Wα))ϕ(−Wα)W⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
 
∇αθ0 = − Φ(Xpoβpo1 + (−Wα))ϕ(−Wα)W⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
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∇βpo1θ0 = −∞
−Wα∫ Φ(Xβ1)ϕ(Xu )dXuXpo .      (B.58) 
 
Finally, we have 
 
∇βu1J(β2 ) = Xp
∇βu1ψ1θ1 − ψ1∇βu1θ1
θ1
2 + (1− Xp )
∇βu1ψ0θ0 − ψ0∇βu1θ0
θ0
2 ,  (B.59) 
 
 
where 
 
 
∇βu1ψ1 = −Wα
∞∫ exp(Xβ2 )Φ(Xβ1)Xuϕ(Xu )dXu ,   (B.60) 
 
 
∇βu1θ1 = −Wα
∞∫ Φ(Xβ1)Xuϕ(Xu )dXu ,       (B.61) 
 
∇βu1ψ0 = −∞
−Wα∫ exp(Xβ2 )Φ(Xβ1)Xuϕ(Xu )dXu ,     (B.62) 
 
and 
 
 
∇βu1θ0 = −∞
−Wα∫ Φ(Xβ1)Xuϕ(Xu )dXu .       (B.63) 
 
 
Derivation of Equation (42) 
 Observe: 
 
  (B.64) 
 
f (Xu | Xp,W,H = 1) =
f (Xu ,H | Xp,W)
f (H | Xp,W)
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Under all modeling assumptions one can write26 
 
 
f (Xu ,H | Xp,W) = XpH
Φ(Xpoβpo1)ϕ[Xu>−Wα](Xu )
Φ(Wα)
+ Xp(1− H)
1−Φ(Xpoβpo1)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ϕ[Xu>−Wα](Xu )
Φ(Wα)
+ (1− Xp )H
Φ(Xpoβpo1)ϕ[Xu≤−Wα](Xu )
1−Φ(Wα)
+ (1− Xp )(1− H)
1−Φ(Xpoβpo1)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ϕ[Xu≤−Wα](Xu )
1−Φ(Wα)
  (B.65) 
 
 
Using (E.2), we can obtain the marginal density of H as follows: 
 
 
f (H | Xp,W) = −∞
∞∫ f (Xu ,H | Xp,W)dXu
= XpHΦ(Xpoβpo1)+ Xp(1− H) 1−Φ(Xpoβpo1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
+ (1− Xp )HΦ(Xpoβpo1)+ (1− Xp )(1− H) 1−Φ(Xpoβpo1)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
. (B.66) 
 
 
Combining (E.1), (E.2), and (E.3), and after omitting components involving H=0, the 
following obtains: 
 
 
f (Xu | Xp,W,H = 1) = Xp
ϕ[Xu>−Wα](Xu )
Φ(Wα)
+ (1− Xp )
ϕ[Xu≤−Wα](Xu )
1−Φ(Wα)
.  (B.67) 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 This follows from the normality assumptions, the fact that conditional on W these random 
variables are independent, and because Xu can be composed in terms of the truncated densities implicit in 
(A.2). 
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On the basis of (E.4) we can write: 
 
 
EXu Y | Xp,W,H = 1
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = −∞
∞∫ exp(Xβ2 )f (Xu | Xp,W,H = 1)dXu
= Xp
−Wα
∞∫ exp(Xβ2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu
Φ(Wα)
+ (1− Xp )
−∞
−Wα∫ exp(Xβ2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu
1−Φ(Wα)
= exp(Xpoβpo2 ) Xp
−Wα
∞∫ exp(Xuβu2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu
Φ(Wα)
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
+ (1− Xp )
−∞
−Wα∫ exp(Xuβu2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu
1−Φ(Wα)
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
 , (B.68) 
 
 
which is sufficient to demonstrate that the first and second part parameters are 
“separable.”  To obtain equation (26) we prove the following statement: 
If z is normal with mean a and variance b, then 
 
 E exp(cz)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = exp(ca + 0.5c
2b) .   (B.69) 
 
 
Proof: 
 
 
E exp(cz)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = −∞
∞∫ exp(cz)
1
2 
exp − (z − a)
2
2b
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
dz   (B.70) 
 
 
Now make the substitution 
 
q = z − a
b
.  We get 
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E exp(cz)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ =
1
2 
−∞
∞∫ exp(c( bq + a))exp(−0.5q2 )dq
= exp(ca) 1
2 
−∞
∞∫ exp(c bq − 0.5q2 )dq
= exp(ca) 1
2 
−∞
∞∫ exp −0.5(q − c b)2 + 0.5c2b( )dq
= exp(ca + 0.5c2b) 1
2 
−∞
∞∫ exp(−0.5(q − c b)2 )dq
= exp(ca + 0.5c2b)
  (B.71) 
 
 
where the last equality follows from the fact that the integral evaluates to one because it 
defines a density function for a normal random variable q with mean  c b . QED 
If we set a=0 and b=1, and let  c = βu2 , then we can use the lemma above to show that 
 
 −Wα
∞∫ exp(Xuβu2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu = exp(0.5βu2
2 )Φ(βu2 + Wα) ,  (B.72) 
 
 
and 
 −∞
−Wα∫ exp(Xuβu2 )ϕ(Xu )dXu = exp(0.5βu2
2 ) 1−Φ(βu2 + Wα)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ .  (B.73) 
 
 
Combining equations (E.5), (E.9), and (E.10) yields equation (26). 
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APPENDIX C 
 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER IV 
 
 
The generalized Hausman tests mentioned in Chapter IV require that I estimate 
joint variance-covariance (VCV) matrices for fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE) 
estimators.  The basic approach I take is to conceptualize the independent estimators as 
solving a “stacked” system of equations.  With this “stacked” system of equations 
standard White’s (1982) sandwich estimator for the joint VCV matrix can be used.  The 
covariance blocks of the resultant joint VCV matrix account for correlation between the 
two models that exists because the same, or an overlapping, sample is used by both 
models. 
 Let 
 
ΘT = αT βT⎡⎣
⎤
⎦  denote the stacked parameter vector associated with a FEP 
model and a REP model.  Let  x1it and x2it  generically denote the vectors of regression 
controls used in FEP model and the REP model, respectively.  Now, define the following 
two functions: 
 
 
Q1i(α) =
t=1
Ti
∑ yit ln
exp(x1itα)
r=1
Ti
∑ exp(x1irα)
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
⎟
⎟
,   
 
 
and
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Q2i(β) = lnΓ η+ yit
t=1
Ti
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− ln
t=1
Ti
∑ Γ 1+ yit( )− lnΓ η( ) + ηln ui( )
+ ln 1− ui( ) yit
t=1
Ti
∑ + yit
t=1
Ti
∑ exp(x2itβ)− yit
t=1
Ti
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
ln exp
t=1
Ti
∑ (x2itβ)
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
  
 
 
where  Ti  denotes the maximum number of observations for individual i, η  denotes a 
gamma “variance” parameter,  Γ( )  denotes the gamma function, and where 
 
 
ui =
η
η+ exp
t=1
Ti
∑ (x2itβ)
 
 
 
Finally, let 
 
 Qi Θ( ) =  Q1i α( ) +  Q2i β( )  
 
 
A legitimate estimator for Θ  can be written as 
 
 
Θ! = argmax
Θ
Qi
i=1
n
∑ (Θ)   (C.1) 
 
 
Problem (C.1) is separable in  α and β .  To see this note that 
 
 
∇ΘQi = ∇αQ1i ∇[β η]Q2i⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,   (C.2) 
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where  ∇κQ  denotes the gradient vector of Q with respect to κ , and has row dimensions 
equal to one and column dimensions equal to the rows of κ .  Therefore, the solution to 
(C.1) is given by the solutions to the two systems of equations: 
 
 
G1(α) = ∇α
i=1
n
∑ Q1i = 0 ,   (C.3) 
 
 
and 
 
 
G 2(β) = ∇[β η]
i=1
n
∑ Q2i = 0 .   (C.4) 
 
 
But (C.3) and (C.4) are the estimating equations associated with the FEP estimator for 
 α and β  conducted in isolation of one another. 
 This discussion serves to point out that problem (C.1) is equivalent to estimating a 
FEP model and REP model in isolation.  Furthermore, the estimator described by (C.1) 
has a well-known VCV matrix estimator.  Let 
 
 
G(Θ) = ∇Θ
i=1
n
∑ Qi = 0  
 
 
A robust estimator for the VCV of (C.1) is 
 
 
Var! Θ"( ) = ∂G(Θ)∂Θ Θ=Θ"
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
−1
∇ΘQi Θ=Θ"i=1
n
∑ ∇ΘQi
T
Θ=Θ"
∂G(Θ)
∂Θ Θ=Θ"
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
−1
  (C.5) 
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The gradient of  Q1i  is
27 
 
 
∇αQ1i =  
t=1
Ti
∑ x1it yit −
exp  x1itα( )
exp
r=1
Ti
∑  x1irα( )
yir
r=1
Ti
∑
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪
⎪
.  (C.6) 
 
 
The gradient of  Q2i  is
28 
 
 
∇βQ2i =  
t=1
Ti
∑ x2it yit − exp(x2itβ)
yir
r=1
Ti
∑ + η
exp
r=1
Ti
∑ (x2itβ)+ η
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪⎪
⎭
⎪
⎪
.  (C.7) 
 
 
The remaining derivative is 
 
 
∇ηQ2i = ψ η+ yit
t=1
Ti
∑
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
− ψ η( ) + ln(ui )+
exp
t=1
Ti
∑ (x2itβ)− yit
t=1
Ti
∑
η+ exp
t=1
Ti
∑ (x2itβ)
,  (C.8) 
 
 
where  ψ( )  denotes the digamma function.  Combining (C.2), (C.6), (C.7), and (C.8) 
yields the gradient of  Qi .  The inverse of the Hessian can be obtained as the standard 
variance-covariance matrix that Stata estimates for each of the models. 
 Under standard arguments Θ  is asymptotically normal with variance 
approximated consistently by (C.5).  Thus the Wald statistic 
                                                
27 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) page 803. 
28 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) page 805. 
 118 
 
 
W =  RΘ!( )T  RVar" Θ!( )  RT⎡⎣⎢ ⎤⎦⎥
−1
 RΘ!( )   (C.9) 
 
 
has a chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is equal to the number 
of rows in the matrix R, or equivalently the number of linear restrictions tested.  The 
above procedures can be easily revised to test other hypotheses as well, such as linear 
restrictions across two FE models.
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Table C1 
 
Complete Inpatient Stay Results 
 
 Total Effects of Part Da  Direct Effectsb 
 FEP REPc REPd  FEP 
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage -0.14** -0.06 -0.05  -0.14 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.09) 
 [-13.02] [-5.53] [-4.96]  [-12.76] 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage 0.03 0.01 0.05  0.04 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) 
 [2.53] [1.03] [5.22]  [3.93] 
Age -0.02 0.01*** 0.02***  -0.13 
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.08) 
Log(Household Income) -0.04* -0.07*** -0.08***  -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
Married 0.01 -0.06 -0.06*  0.09 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.08) 
High School Graduate  -0.08** -0.08**   
  (0.04) (0.04)   
Some College  -0.03 -0.06   
  (0.05) (0.05)   
College or Beyond  -0.06 -0.08*   
  (0.05) (0.05)   
Nonwhite  -0.06 -0.08*   
  (0.04) (0.05)   
Female  -0.15*** -0.17***   
  (0.03) (0.03)   
Other Drug Coverage -0.01 -0.01 -0.03  0.03 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.05) 
HMO -0.02 -0.06* -0.07*  -0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) 
Medicaid -0.17** 0.01 0.04  -0.09 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.13) 
CHAMPUS -0.01 -0.05 0.09  0.04 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.09)  (0.09) 
Medigap -0.01 -0.03 -0.00  -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) 
ADL (Baseline) 0.01 0.07*** 0.09***  0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.03) 
IADL (Baseline) 0.01 0.05 0.07*  0.04 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)  (0.14) 
CESD (Baseline) 0.01 0.03*** 0.04***  0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
Active Conditions (Baseline) -0.01 0.15*** 0.20***  -0.00 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.03) 
ADL (Follow-Up)     0.05* 
     (0.03) 
IADL (Follow-Up)     0.14** 
     (0.06) 
CESD (Follow-Up)     0.02* 
     (0.01) 
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Active Conditions (Follow-Up)     0.23*** 
     (0.03) 
Northeast -0.03 0.09 0.11*  -0.11 
 (0.30) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.41) 
Midwest -0.06 0.11*** 0.17***  -0.14 
 (0.25) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.37) 
South -0.14 0.07* 0.09**  -0.06 
 (0.23) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.33) 
1996-1998 (Base: 2004-2006) -1.09** -0.67*** -0.54***  -1.82*** 
 (0.49) (0.10) (0.11)  (0.58) 
1998-2002 -0.79** -0.45*** -0.34***  -1.32*** 
 (0.37) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.44) 
2000-2002 -0.50** -0.27*** -0.19***  -0.86*** 
 (0.25) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.30) 
2002-2004 -0.24* -0.12*** -0.07***  -0.41*** 
 (0.13) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.15) 
2006-2008 0.24* 0.12*** 0.07***  0.41*** 
 (0.13) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.15) 
2008-2010 0.50** 0.27*** 0.19***  0.86*** 
 (0.25) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.30) 
Observations: 19495 19495 30650  11689 
Respondents: 5042 5042 10075  3193 
FEP v. REP:e  221.59 373.10   
p value:  {0.00} {0.00}   
REP v. REP:f   324.11   
p value:   {0.00}   
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage:g     0.00 
p value:     {0.97} 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage:h     0.04 
p value:     {0.84} 
Health (Follow-Up):i     97.61 
p value:     {0.00} 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Transformed incidence rate ratios (i.e., {IRR-1} × 100) in square brackets; the transformed IRRs 
represent the percentage impact of the covariate 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a The total effects of Part D measure the effects of Part D that operate through changes in beneficiary 
health plus any direct effects. 
b The direct effects of Part D measure the effects of Part D that do not operate through changes in 
beneficiary health. 
c Column reports results from a random effects Poisson estimator applied to the fixed effects sample. 
d Column reports results from a random effects Poisson estimator applied to the full sample. 
e Tests the equality of the common coefficients across the FEP and REP models. 
f Tests the equality of the coefficients across the two REP models. 
g Tests the equality of the Part D effect among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage. 
h Tests the equality of the Part D effect among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug 
coverage. 
i Tests the joint significance of ADL (Follow-Up), IADL (Follow-Up), CESD (Follow-Up), and 
Active Conditions (Follow-Up). 
 
 
 121 
Table C2 
 
Complete Hospital Night Results 
 
 Total Effects of Part Da  Direct Effectsb 
 FEP REPc REPd  FEP 
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage -0.18* -0.16 -0.17  -0.14 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10)  (0.16) 
 [-16.52] [-14.58] [-15.31]  [-12.87] 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage -0.25* -0.20* -0.21*  -0.15 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.16) 
 [-21.91] [-18.53] [-18.84]  [-13.55] 
Age 0.23** 0.04*** 0.05***  -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.00) (0.01)  (0.12) 
Log(Household Income) -0.05 -0.06** -0.06**  0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.04) 
Married -0.03 -0.09 -0.09  -0.24 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.15) 
High School Graduate  -0.13* -0.30***   
  (0.07) (0.09)   
Some College  -0.07 -0.26**   
  (0.10) (0.12)   
College or Beyond  -0.19** -0.46***   
  (0.09) (0.10)   
Nonwhite  0.19* 0.32**   
  (0.10) (0.13)   
Female  -0.09 -0.17**   
  (0.06) (0.07)   
Other Drug Coverage -0.13* -0.13* -0.13*  -0.04 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.11) 
HMO -0.03 -0.05 -0.04  -0.09 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.10) 
Medicaid -0.18 -0.14 -0.15  0.03 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)  (0.17) 
CHAMPUS 0.14 0.09 0.12  0.27* 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.16) 
Medigap 0.05 0.02 0.02  0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.11) 
ADL (Baseline) -0.03 -0.00 -0.00  0.08 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.06) 
IADL (Baseline) -0.16** -0.13* -0.12*  0.02 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)  (0.12) 
CESD (Baseline) 0.02 0.02 0.03  -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  (0.02) 
Active Conditions (Baseline) 0.00 0.04 0.04  0.00 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)  (0.05) 
ADL (Follow-Up)     0.14*** 
     (0.05) 
IADL (Follow-Up)     -0.14 
     (0.14) 
CESD (Follow-Up)     0.06*** 
     (0.02) 
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Active Conditions (Follow-Up)     0.23*** 
     (0.05) 
Northeast -0.48 0.10 0.09  -0.52 
 (0.49) (0.16) (0.20)  (0.65) 
Midwest -1.01** -0.11 -0.22  -1.23* 
 (0.46) (0.18) (0.22)  (0.71) 
South -0.36 0.06 0.03  -0.23 
 (0.41) (0.15) (0.18)  (0.59) 
1996-1998 (Base: 2004-2006) 0.44 -0.85*** -0.74***  -1.32 
 (0.84) (0.20) (0.20)  (0.88) 
1998-2002 0.40 -0.59*** -0.51***  -0.93 
 (0.64) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.67) 
2000-2002 0.31 -0.37*** -0.30***  -0.58 
 (0.44) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.46) 
2002-2004 0.18 -0.17*** -0.14***  -0.27 
 (0.22) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.23) 
2006-2008 -0.18 0.17*** 0.14***  0.27 
 (0.22) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.23) 
2008-2010 -0.31 0.37*** 0.30***  0.58 
 (0.44) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.46) 
Observations: 19495 19495 30650  11679 
Respondents: 5042 5042 10075  3190 
FEP v. REP:e  218.42 208.83   
p value:  {0.00} {0.00}   
REP v. REP:f   103.43   
p value:   {0.00}   
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage:g     0.11 
p value:     {0.73} 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage:h     0.67 
p value:     {0.41} 
Health (Follow-Up):i     50.46 
p value:     {0.00} 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Transformed incidence rate ratios (i.e., {IRR-1} × 100) in square brackets; the transformed IRRs 
represent the percentage impact of the covariate 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a The total effects of Part D measure the effects of Part D that operate through changes in beneficiary 
health plus any direct effects. 
b The direct effects of Part D measure the effects of Part D that do not operate through changes in 
beneficiary health. 
c Column reports results from a random effects Poisson estimator applied to the fixed effects sample. 
d Column reports results from a random effects Poisson estimator applied to the full sample. 
e Tests the equality of the common coefficients across the FEP and REP models. 
f Tests the equality of the coefficients across the two REP models. 
g Tests the equality of the Part D effect among beneficiaries who had limited or no pre-Part D drug 
coverage. 
h Tests the equality of the Part D effect among beneficiaries who had generous pre-Part D drug 
coverage. 
i Tests the joint significance of ADL (Follow-Up), IADL (Follow-Up), CESD (Follow-Up), and 
Active Conditions (Follow-Up). 
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Table C3 
 
Complete Results for Active Health Conditionsa 
 
 FEP REPb REPc 
Limited Pre-Part D Coverage -0.09* -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 [-8.46] [-4.36] [-0.71] 
Generous Pre-Part D Coverage -0.09** 0.02 0.10** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
 [-9.00] [1.63] [10.84] 
Age 0.03 -0.00 0.01*** 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log(Household Income) 0.01 -0.05*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Married -0.02 -0.09*** -0.10*** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
High School Graduate  -0.12*** -0.18*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) 
Some College  -0.19*** -0.23*** 
  (0.04) (0.05) 
College or Beyond  -0.18*** -0.33*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) 
Nonwhite  -0.11*** -0.07* 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
Female  -0.02 0.06* 
  (0.03) (0.03) 
Other Drug Coverage -0.01 -0.03 -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HMO -0.01 -0.09*** -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Medicaid -0.01 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
CHAMPUS 0.06 0.08 0.10* 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Medigap 0.01 -0.08*** -0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Northeast -0.36 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.26) (0.04) (0.05) 
Midwest -0.14 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.20) (0.04) (0.04) 
South -0.25 0.06* 0.07* 
 (0.20) (0.04) (0.04) 
1996-1998 (Base: 2004-2006) -0.47 -0.22*** 0.02 
 (0.32) (0.08) (0.08) 
1998-2000 -0.33 -0.15*** 0.01 
 (0.24) (0.05) (0.05) 
2000-2002 -0.20 -0.09*** 0.01 
 (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) 
2002-2004 -0.09 -0.04*** 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
2006-2008 0.09 0.04*** -0.01 
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 (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) 
2008-2010 0.20 0.09*** -0.01 
 (0.16) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations: 11609 11609 20961 
Respondents: 3329 3329 7511 
FEP v. REP:d  497.01 611.33 
p value:  {0.00} {0.00} 
REP v. REP:e   147.46 
p value:   {0.00} 
Cluster-robust standard errors are in parentheses 
Transformed incidence rate ratios (i.e., {IRR-1} × 100) in square brackets; the transformed IRRs represent 
the percentage impact of the covariate 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
a Active health conditions include: hypertension (not under control), diabetes (not under control), cancer 
(in treatment), lung disease (limits activity), stroke (problems persist), arthritis (limits activity), 
myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, angina (limits activity), and psychiatric disorder (in 
treatment). 
b Column reports results from a random effects Poisson applied to the fixed effects sample. 
c Column reports results from a random effects Poisson applied to the full sample. 
d Tests the equality of the coefficients in the FEP and REP models. 
e Tests the equality of the coefficients in the two REP models. 
 
